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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the Afghan imbroglio from two angles: understanding the peculiar 
nature of insurgency being faced by the U.S. and NATO, and the ongoing power politics 
and conflicting interests of Afghanistan’s neighbors and other important actors in the 
conflict. After nine years of a bloody Afghan conflict, which has engulfed the 
neighboring nuclear armed Pakistan as well, the U.S. is far from achieving its desired 
objectives in Afghanistan and the region. The U.S. strategy employed, so far, reflects 
serious deficiencies that encourage the insurgents to regroup for an organized resistance 
against the world’s mightiest military coalition. Two important factors generally ignored 
by many analysts are: the impact of outstanding regional disputes and politics on the war, 
and the willingness of important actors in the conflict to help achieve its resolution. Due 
to the region’s geo-strategic significance, major powers have conflicting economic and 
political interests beyond just fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.  By 
developing a better understanding of the nature of insurgency in Afghanistan and of the 
broader regional politics, the international community may yet find a respectable solution 
to an extremely complex situation in Afghanistan, a country surrounded by nuclear-
armed rivals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the lightning success of the U.S. and anti-Taliban forces (i.e., the 
Northern Alliance [NA]) in overthrowing the Taliban regime in 2001, a gradual 
insurgency began to develop—particularly after the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 and lost its 
focus in Afghanistan. Despite a lapse of almost nine years, the U.S. is still struggling to 
consolidate its gains in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda has survived, whereas the Taliban has 
reorganized during the intervening period and is posing a serious threat to the coalition 
forces in Afghanistan. Historically, Afghanistan and the present day western provinces of 
Pakistan have remained intertwined because of overlapping ethnic, cultural, tribal and 
religious affinities. Any development on either side of the ill-defined border immediately 
impacts both countries. The porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
particularly along the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), also enables the 
terrorists to escape counterinsurgency (COIN) operations launched by either side.  
The modicum of legitimacy that the U.S. earned after the removal of the Taliban 
regime as an act of “self defense” has gradually dwindled due to the inability of the U.S. 
to exploit its initial success. The experience of the past nine years in Afghanistan has 
forced the U.S. to review its strategy in Afghanistan—with protecting the population 
having become the new “mission.”1 At the same time, the Karzai government has failed 
to deliver and has not been able to establish its legitimacy amongst the Afghan 
population—despite its highly controversial re-election in 2009. The lack of security, 
along with corruption and drug trafficking have only helped the Taliban to become 
stronger in Afghanistan. The U.S.’s over-commitment in Iraq and neglect of Afghanistan 
are now proving fatal to regional and global peace and security.  
Little attention has been paid to the power politics among regional and 
international actors who are struggling to dominate the region, as we remain mostly 
engrossed with the “war on terror” in Afghanistan—a term out of fashion since the 
changeover from the Bush administration.  The conflicting interests of various actors 
                                                 
1 Headquarters ISAF (Kabul), ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 26, 2009. 
http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/NATO_ISAFCommanderCounterinsurgencyGuidance.pdf (accessed 
August 25, 2009). 
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have their roots in the Cold War era.  Russia, China and Iran are suspicious of the U.S.’s 
prolonged stay in the region, whereas India and Pakistan are engaged with their own 
proxies behind the scenes. The region has immense geostrategic significance as it 
provides access to Central Asia’s riches. But also, Afghanistan has a long history of being 
meddled in by neighbors and foreigners, and thus the present situation demands a strategy 
that must treats the region as a whole. Without broader positive support from 
Afghanistan’s neighbors and other critical actors, the prospects of U.S. success remain 
minimal in Afghanistan.   
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
The scope of this qualitative study will be two-fold; understanding the peculiar 
nature of insurgency in Afghanistan and addressing the need for a positive role by 
Afghanistan’s neighbors and other regional actors in resolving the conflict. The purpose 
of understanding the nature of Afghan insurgency will be to establish that a different set 
of tools are needed to handle the present situation—other than the conventional military 
surge and efforts to engineer democracy in a deeply tribal and unorthodox religious 
society. The purpose of exploring the other variable is to highlight the conflicting 
interests of various actors in the conflict and the quest for regional preeminence by a few 
states, which is consequently polluting the overall environment in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Minimizing the disagreements among the stakeholders and securing their 
positive support is necessary for the U.S. to achieve an honorable outcome and long-term 
stability in the region.  
B. THESIS QUESTION AND IMPORTANCE 
The question being answered in this thesis is: “Is successful COIN possible in 
Afghanistan without positive support from Afghanistan’s neighbors and other important 
actors in the conflict?”   
In view of the dynamics and history of conflict in the region, the question posed 
above is complex, but extremely important, as it involves regional and extra-regional 
powers having direct or indirect involvement and conflicting interests in Afghanistan. 
The failure to capture or kill al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders casts serious doubts on the 
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credibility of the coalition forces engaged in the region since 2001. The Obama 
administration’s renewed focus on the region signals this administration’s resolve to find 
a respectable solution, without wasting further time and precious U.S. resources. The 
announcement of an “AfPak” policy marked a heightened commitment by the Obama 
administration to the region. President Obama’s desire to reach out to Russia, China and 
Iran, and even the ‘moderate’ Taliban to resolve the Afghanistan crisis reflects a positive 
shift in U.S. policy. The difficulty with a multilateral approach, however, is that it calls 
for respect of others’ interests. It also demands a degree of compromise about one’s own 
interests to meet a larger goal. How far the U.S. is willing to adjust its objectives in 
Afghanistan—both declared and implied—is yet to be determined.  
C. METHODOLOGY  
The framework for this thesis has been primarily derived from the inductive and 
deductive material available about the history of Afghanistan. This is critical to 
understanding the nature of insurgency in the region. The path diagram below describes 
the causal mechanisms with regard to my first hypothesis—understanding the nature of 
insurgency will facilitate a better outcome: 
 
Figure 1.   Hypothesis 1. 
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A brief description of each construct in Figure 1 provides insight into the 
complexities in Afghanistan, and their potential to spread from Afghanistan into Pakistan 
and beyond. The weaknesses in existing U.S. strategy thus far will be highlighted to 
support my argument that the U.S. lacks a sufficient understanding about the nature of 
insurgency in Afghanistan. As Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Professor Thomas 
Johnson asserts, there are great similarities between the U.S.’s reactions in Afghanistan 
and Vietnam. Chief among them is a lack of understanding about the nature of the threat 
and lack of a coherent strategy by the U.S.2  
The second hypothesis concentrates primarily on the fourth corner in Professor 
Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” model for COIN, foreign actors, with the other 
three being the state, the counter-state, and the population.3  
 
 
Figure 2.   McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model. 
                                                 
2 Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Afghanistan is Today’s Vietnam. No Question Mark 
Needed.” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/20/saigon_2009 (accessed December 10, 2009). 
3 Gordon McCormick (Head of the Defense Analysis Department, NPS), “Operationalizing the 
Insurgent / Counterinsurgent Process” (lecture, NPS, Monterey, CA, February 9, 2009). 
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As McCormick’s Mystic Diamond suggests, the role played by Vietnam’s neighbors and 
by Afghanistan’s during the Soviet occupation proved to be critical to the outcome in 
each instance. In fact, in both conflicts neighbors supported the insurgents, which led to 
the defeat of the two superpowers involved. What thus needs to be explored in the current 
case is the nature of interests the neighbors and major actors have in the ongoing 
Afghanistan war. And, once these interests are understood, the question we must then ask 
is: is it possible to obtain positive support from Afghanistan’s neighbors and other 
important actors for an honorable resolution of the conflict?   
The path diagram below describes the causal mechanisms that inform my second 
hypothesis—about the need to elicit a more positive role by Afghanistan’s neighbors and 
important actors to facilitate a better outcome:  
 
 
Figure 3.   Hypothesis 2. 
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D. THESIS OUTLINE 
1. Chapter I: Introduction  
2. Chapter II: Understanding Afghanistan 
This chapter will cover the role of history, culture, religion, and the ethnic 
dimensions of the Afghan conflict. Considering these factors, and assessing the strength 
of Pashtun nationalism and the Taliban-al-Qaeda confluence in Afghanistan and the 
FATA, should improve our understanding of Afghanistan and its relationship with 
Pakistan.  
3. Chapter III: The Nature of Insurgency in Afghanistan  
This chapter will review the causes of insurgency and the forms it has taken. 
Secondly, the chapter will analyze the peculiar nature of insurgency in Afghanistan to 
convince readers that the conflict there is unique and requires different treatment from 
any other contemporary insurgency.  
4. Chapter IV: The Opposing Strategies  
This chapter will first analyze insurgent strategies, followed by analysis of U.S. 
and Pakistani strategies in combating the threats in Afghanistan and the FATA. The 
purpose of this analysis is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s 
strategies. 
5. Chapter V: The Regional Power Politics 
This chapter will briefly discuss the conflicting interests of Iran, India, China and 
Russia and their impact on the war in Afghanistan. The interests of the U.S. and Pakistan 
will likewise be discussed in order to illuminate the complexity of inter-relations in the 
region. This chapter should be helpful to those decision makers who are involved in 
policy review for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the broader region. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
 No matter how well the U.S. and its coalition partners in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan do tactically, or in terms of micro measures on the ground, until the right policy 
and strategy are in place, no meaningful improvement can be expected. The inability of 
coalition forces to stabilize Afghanistan since 2001 indicates that there have been 
fundamental shortfalls in U.S. policy and military strategy right from the start. Pakistan, 
an important neighbor of Afghanistan and critical partner in the war there, is being 
destabilized, which is bound to further adversely affect regional stability.  The focus of 
this thesis, therefore, is to highlight the importance of the bigger picture in terms of the 
regional environment instead of delving into micro issues—which themselves derive 
from the broader policy. The war in Afghanistan cannot be understood in isolation or 
independently without taking into account the complex political, economic, and security 
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II. UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The region that is present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan has witnessed decisive 
events in the past and has been characterized as the “cross-roads” of civilizations, thanks 
to the existence of the famous Silk Route.4 Consequently, the region has perhaps seen 
more invasions than any other in Asia, or indeed the world.5 Persians, Scythians, 
Macedonians and Greeks, Hans, Mongols, Arabs, Turks, Moguls, the British and the 
Soviets all attempted to conquer and subdue the Afghans (including tribal areas of 
Pakistan), but failed.6 Apart from serving as a staging area for invasions into India, 
Afghanistan provided an important trade link between the west and east, as well as north 
and south.  
Afghanistan emerged as a nation-state in 1919 at the end of the third Anglo-
Afghan war. However, the process of state consolidation began in 1747 with Ahmed 
Shah Abdali.7 Afghanistan is a state where history, tribal culture, geography, and religion 
have always mattered greatly and, therefore, needs to be dealt with discreetly. For 
instance, glancing back through important lessons learned by outsiders in Afghanistan 
and in the tribal areas of Pakistan can be extremely useful for understanding the 
characteristics of this volatile region. This chapter will briefly describe important 
features, the background of the Afghan Jihad, the complexities that inhere in FATA’s 
connections with Afghanistan, and the impact of the Durand Line on Pak-Afghan 
relations to include the ongoing war in Afghanistan.  
                                                 
4 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War; State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the 
Taliban  (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 2001), 159. 
5 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.- A.D 1957 ( London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1958), 25. 
6 Jerry J. Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), xii. 
7 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 27. 
 10
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFGHANISTAN 
One thing that should never be overlooked is that the Soviet invasion in 1979 had 
three profound effects.8 First, disruption of the social structure and removal of the prewar 
elites led to the emergence of new political Islamists (Taliban), in addition to 
reinvigoration of an array of mujahidin parties. Second, violence became a norm in the 
society, even in non-combat situations. Third, the economic structure was completely 
destroyed, creating space for the resurgence of an opium-based economy.9Being in a 
country as devastated as Afghanistan, and then seeing it through a western prism, can 
lead to wrong conclusions.  Analyzing the present Afghan imbroglio, and its uncertain 
future, requires factoring those features that shape Afghanistan and its people, to include 
its recent history.  
Numerous factors have made the emergence of Afghanistan as a cohesive state 
difficult, and these continue to present challenges. The five major factors distinguishing 
Afghanistan from any other state are: First, Afghan people are deeply divided along 
ethnic and linguistic lines. However, sectarian, tribal and racial divisions also exist—
further compounding the social terrain. Second, diverse religious interpretations influence 
local tribal culture. Third, the social system is based on communal loyalties, which often 
override higher-order identities, thus, making Afghanistan a highly decentralized society. 
Fourth, the rugged terrain and lack of economic development increases the distance 
between the people and the central government. And fifth, Afghanistan has a long history 
of meddling neighbors due to its geo-strategic location.10   
The above factors and the Afghan passion for independence have imparted a 
rugged individualism to the Afghans that is rare in other people.11 Most of the Afghan 
tribes have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, agreeing to central control only in 
                                                 
8 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 97. 
9 Ninety-three percent of the World’s Opium is produced in Afghanistan, which reached its highest 
ever production in 2006–07.  For more details see report by Stephen Jones, UK Parliament. House of 
Commons. Afghanistan and Narcotics: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends 2001-2009. SN/ IA/05025. 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05025.pdf  (accessed February 16, 2010). 
10 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 12−14. 
11 Ibid., xii. 
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the face of an overwhelming foreign force. According to Jerry Roberts, “Afghanistan is 
perhaps a classic example of Machiavelli’s ‘state of many princes,’ in that, while easily 
entered, it has proven impossible to subdue.”12 Though resistance has often remained 
localized, the diversity and autonomous character of Afghans has at times been 
advantageous to them, as foreigners are sucked into dealing with multiple targets instead 
of crushing one single entity that would thereby kill a rebellion. In other words, in the 
wake of weak central authority, Afghanistan has always been an easy state to invade.13  
Although the Afghans claim to have never been conquered, they have never 
conventionally fought an invader on the borders or in the field either.14 Invaders have 
always been ousted through a protracted campaign. Muhammad Ali, an Afghan writer, 
explains:  
One of the most dominant characteristics of the Afghan is his intense love 
of independence. The Afghan patiently bears his misfortunes or poverty 
but he cannot be made to reconcile himself to foreign rule…. Foreigners 
who have failed to understand this point and who have tried to deprive 
him of his national independence or personal freedom had to pay heavily 
for the price of folly.15 
Afghanistan has never been a homogeneous country, but instead has always been 
a conglomeration of different tribes and ethnic groups. The Pashtuns are the dominant 
ethnic group in Afghanistan today and have always remained influential in Afghan 
society since the eighteenth century. Pashtuns are also the largest existing tribal society in 
the world.16 The Pashtuns are divided into three main groups. Members of the Durrani 
tribe, which ruled the country from 1749 to 1978, are primarily found north and west of 
Kandahar.17 Members of the Ghilzai tribe, who were defeated by the Duranis, are found 
in the east and north of Afghanistan. All other tribes, representing the third leg of the 
                                                 
12 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, xii. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Steve Coll, “The Case for Humility in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2009. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/16/the_case_for_humility_in_afghanistan  (accessed 
December 12, 2009). 
15 Roberts, The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan, xii. 
16 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 14. 
17 Ibid., 14. 
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tribal triangle, are spread throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although there are 
roughly 25 different ethnic groups in Afghanistan, major ethnic groups and their 
overlapping distribution astride borders with neighbors can be depicted as follows: 
 
Figure 4.   Ethno-linguistic groups in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.18 
Population (millions) 32.7 
Pashtun 13.7 (42 %) 
Tajik 8.2 (27%) 
Hazara 2.9 (9%) 
Uzbek 2.9 (9%) 
Aimak 1.3 (4%) 
Turkmen 1.0 (3%) 
Baloch 0.7 (2%) 
Others 1.3 (4%) 
Table 1.   Population and ethnic distribution in Afghanistan. 19 
Tribes remain the largest, permanent political and social entities in the country—
allegiance of individuals almost never extends beyond these tribal units.20 In the absence 
                                                 
18 Feroz H. Khan, “History of Afghanistan,” (Presentation, NPS, Monterey, CA, January 2010).  
19 Afghan Index,  Brookings, December 7, 2009. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/afghanistan%20index/index20091207.pdf   
(accessed January 21, 2010). 
20 Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, 14.  
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of invaders, inter-tribal rivalry takes off; however, in the face of foreign invasion all 
tribes unite. As Louis Dupree notes, “the two Pashtun tribes might fight each other to the 
death for control of Herat, Farah, and Qandahar [Kandahar], but any external invader 
welded them together in a common cause.”21 The Pashtuns have demonstrated this 
tendency repeatedly. However, they have also been famous for shifting their alliances 
after being militarily overpowered or thanks to political dealings.  
The Pashtuns live by their own tribal code, pashtunwali, which is an unwritten set 
of values that govern routine life, as well as every category of dispute among individuals 
and among tribes. These include melmestia (hospitality to guests), nanawati (the right to 
asylum), badal (blood revenge), tureh (bravery) and nang (honor).22Some of these 
contradict the tenets of Islam. For example, Islam places stress on forgiveness rather than 
badal, and offers an altogether different interpretation of nang and nanawati. Pashtunwali 
directs retribution for violations of family honor, and revenge is more than an obligation 
for an individual, a family, or a tribe. The traditional Loya Jirgah (National Grand 
Council), comprised of influential tribal, religious, and urban leaders, can represent a 
semblance of central authority, but it typically meets only in times of crisis.23 While local 
Jirgahs have long assisted with the routine governance of villages, traditional Afghan 
government authority has remained an anomaly to most Afghans.   
Islam has long been at the core of the ordinary Afghan’s life. However, Afghans’ 
interpretation of Islam reveals certain contradictions. Before the Soviet invasion, the 
Afghans were tolerant of other sects, religions, and modern lifestyles. However, the 
Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Occupation and the ensuing civil war (1992–96) severely 
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“the Islam practiced in Afghan villages, nomad camps, and most urban areas (the ninety 
to ninety-five percent non-literates) would be almost unrecognizable to a sophisticated 
Muslim scholar.”25  
What deserves mention is that while Islam and pashtunwali govern Pashtun daily 
life, these are so entrenched that they are taken for granted.  Arguably, this is one reason 
the country has continued to remain in the grip of Islamist extremists and has the 
potential to export the same to neighboring Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics 
(CARs).   
Throughout, one constant has been Afghan tribes’ willingness to fight foreigners, 
neighbors, and even their own countrymen. The Afghans—Pashtuns in particular—have 
become “almost genetically expert in guerrilla warfare after centuries of resisting all 
comers, and fighting amongst themselves when no comers were available.”26 The British 
Indian armies invaded Afghanistan three times to prevent it from coming under Russian 
influence during the “Great Game” between 1839 and 1920, but failed to maintain a 
permanent presence each time.27 Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a 
former British officer wrote:  
As one who has had considerable personal experience of engaging in 
military operations against the hill men of those regions, I know exactly 
what the Russian army is up against. I firmly believe that the Russians 
have bitten off a lot more than they can chew. Let them stew in their own 
juice, and go on wasting a lot of military effort to no purpose.28 
While many members of the western intelligentsia predicted that war in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet era would lead to a “Soviet Vietnam,” today it is widely 
believed that Afghanistan is actually reprising America’s Vietnam.29 In March 2009, 
Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper expressed clearly that “foreign forces can’t 
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defeat the Afghan insurgency, as Afghanistan has historically remained in a constant state 
of insurgency. If we think that we are going to govern Afghanistan for Afghans, or over 
the long-term be responsible for day-to-day security in Afghanistan and see that country 
improves, we are mistaken.”30 As Andrew J. Bacevich echoes, “fixing Afghanistan is not 
only unnecessary, it’s likely to prove impossible. Not for nothing has the place acquired 
the nickname, “Graveyard of Empires.”31  
C. BACKGROUND TO THE “AFGHAN JIHAD” 
The history of twentieth century Jihad is based on events that shaped the world in 
the post-WW-II period. The development of modern Islamic extremism can be traced to 
the creation of Israel. Extremism received a tremendous boost as a consequence of the 
Arab-Israeli wars, and finally triumphed after the defeat of the Soviets when Jihad was 
used as an instrument of state policy by the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other 
supporting states.  Thus, governments from the West and Muslim world alike are equally 
responsible for creating this Frankenstein. However, as with Frankenstein, failure to 
handle their creation in the post-Soviet period enabled it go wild.  
Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the U.S. decided 
to use “proxy warfare” against the Soviets.32 The CIA and Inter Services Intelligence 
(ISI) of Pakistan fully cooperated in supporting, funding, training, recruiting, and 
coordinating the “Mujahedeen” operations against the Soviets inside Afghanistan.33 The 
U.S. committed $4–5 billion between 1980 and 1992 to support the Mujahedeen, which 
was equally matched by Saudi Arabia.34 The total aid provided by the U.S., Saudi Arabia,  
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and other countries—mostly in the form of lethal weapons—amounted to over $10 
billion.35 The approximate expenditure by the Soviets was $5 billion per year ($45 billion 
in total), and yet they lost.36  
The FATA in Pakistan provided an ideal location from which to launch the 
Mujahedeen against the Soviets inside Afghanistan. The U.S. regarded the possibility of 
mobilizing one billion Muslims against what President Reagan called the “Evil Empire” a 
“God-sent opportunity.”37 During a reception at the White House, President Reagan is on 
record describing the Mujahedeen as the moral equivalents of the U.S. Founding Fathers 
thanks to their role against the Evil Empire.38   
In 1984, Osama Bin-Laden established himself as a patron of Jihad and founded 
the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK or “Office of Services”) in the FATA, which later 
evolved into al-Qaeda.39 What is important to note is that none of this happened in a 
vacuum as the CIA and ISI helped the Mujahedeen throughout.40 Some analysts believe 
that Bin-Laden even received security training from the CIA.41  As President Musharraf 
has pointed out, the collaboration of the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia in supporting 
the Mujahedeen achieved what Hitler and Napoleon failed to achieve: the defeat of 
Russia.42   
As the Mujahedeen struggle intensified, the U.S. sensed the Soviets were thinking 
of withdrawing from Afghanistan.43 Disagreements arose between the CIA’s Near East 
division and the State Department over the future role of the U.S. in Afghanistan after the 
Soviet withdrawal.  Despite a special U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that 
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predicted the future Afghan government might be “actively hostile” towards the U.S., the 
U.S. government abandoned any political negotiations with the Mujahedeen—something, 
in retrospect, helped make the NIE correct.44 Many anti-communist ideologues in the 
Reagan administration believed that the CIA’s pullback from Afghanistan would be 
tantamount to selling out the Afghan rebel cause. In their view, the U.S. goal should have 
been to ensure “Afghan self-determination” and a government chosen by the “freedom 
fighters.”45  
Regrettably, the immediate loss of interest in the region by the U.S. after the 
Soviet withdrawal can be deemed one major cause of the Jihadists’ triumph in post-
Soviet Afghanistan and beyond, and has to be counted among the lapses that led to the 
9/11 attacks. After these years one may also ask why Jihad was embraced then, but 
cursed now? 
D. THE FATA CONNECTION 
The FATA, inhabited primarily by tribal Pashtuns is located along the disputed 
western border (Durand Line) between Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
and Afghanistan, a territory covering approximately 27,500 square Kilometers (3.4 % of 
Pakistan’s land mass).46 The border of the FATA with Afghanistan is 1360 kilometers 
long. The FATA is home to some 3.17 million Pashtun tribesmen (2.05 % of Pakistan’s 
population), as well as 1.5 million Afghan refugees.47  The border region is inhospitable 
and inaccessible, with extremely rugged mountainous terrain. Heights range between 
8,000 and 15,000 feet. The population of adjoining NWFP is 19.63 million (two-thirds of 
                                                 
44 Coll, Ghost Wars, 173. 
45 Ibid., 176. 
46 Government of Pakistan.  “FATA,” Population Demographics. 
http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/population.php  (accessed December 29, 2009). 
47 Shuja Nawaz, FATA—A Most Dangerous Place. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies (CSIS), January 2009, 1.  
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf (accessed January 10, 2010). 
 18
whom are Pashtuns);48  the total population of Pashtuns in Pakistan is 25 million (14.7 % 
of Pakistan’s population)49—almost double the Pashtun population in Afghanistan.  
 
Agency Area (sq km) Population Population density 
( per sq km) 
Annual growth rate 
(%) 
FATA 27,220 3,176,331 117 2.19 
Bajaur 1,290 595,227 461 4.33 
Khyber 2,576 546,730 212 3.92 
Kurram 3,380 448,310 133 2.50 
Mohmand 2,296 334,453 146 4.28 
NWA 4,707 361,246 77 2.46 
Orakzai 1,538 225,441 147 -2.69 
SWA 6,620 429,841 65 1.95 
Table 2.   Area, population and annual growth rate in FATA.50 
According to Pakistan’s constitution, responsibility for administering the FATA 
rests with the federal government through the Governor of the NWFP in his capacity as 
an agent of the President of Pakistan. The governor works through a Political Agent (PA) 
in each agency, who is selected by the federal government from a pool of civil service 
officers. 
Today there are at least four major different security threats emanating from the 
FATA: foreign terrorists; Afghan Taliban; Pakistani Taliban; and sectarian groups.51 
Another threat that has emerged is the criminal element that is exploiting the situation 
and committing crimes under the aegis of these major groups. Meanwhile Pakistan’s own 
national security is at stake thanks to growing international concerns about the FATA and 
its role in injecting Islamist extremism and terrorism into Pakistan.  
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Figure 5.   Map of the FATA.52 
It is significant that after sixty-three years of independence and global respect for 
the nation-state system, the Pakistan government has been unable to transform the FATA 
and its adjoining, ethnically similar Frontier Regions (FRs) of the NWFP into settled 
areas with secure borders. Administratively, the FATA is divided into seven political 
agencies. Immediately to the east of FATA are six contiguous FRs, also under the 
Governor’s control, though for routine administration purposes these come under the 
provincial government of the NWFP (Figure 5).  
The constitution of Pakistan recognizes the above status, yet its legislation does 
not apply in the FATA, which is administered via the system consolidated in 1901 under 
British colonial rule. A unique feature of the British Indian government’s judicial system 
for the province, to include the tribal territory, was the Frontier Crime Regulations 
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(FCR).53  The FCR was enacted by the Punjab Government in 1872, and revised in 1887 
and again in 1901, when the NWFP was created. These regulations authorized a PA to 
refer all criminal and civil cases to the Jirgah—in vogue even today in the FATA. Not 
only have successive governments in Pakistan been able to have neglect the FATA as a 
consequence of its special status, but the disputed Durand Line and the tribes’ own 
resistance to change have resulted in the FATA’s economic stagnation, lack of basic 
development, and descent into religious extremism, drug trafficking, gun running, and 
political alienation.  
Compounding these problems is that the multilayered governing institutions in the 
FATA support what is at best a loose security apparatus. The lowest tier of security is 
provided by the khasadars, which function under the PA of each agency. These elements 
are drawn strictly from the local tribes, whose composition mirrors local demographics. 
Second, the Frontier Constabulary (FC), recruited from the settled areas and not the 
FATA, led by NWFP police officers. This force has the primary function in the areas 
adjacent to the FATA, the FRs. However, this force can be called up for law and order 
duties in the FATA. Third, the Frontier Corps NWFP (FC NWFP) remains the primary  
paramilitary force in the FATA, which is responsible for law and order and border 
control of the FATA. The FC NWFP comes under the Ministry of Interior. Due to this, it 
is distinct from the regular Pakistan army.  
The FC NWFP troops are recruited and trained locally. However, they are led by 
officers from the Pakistan army commanded by a two star General. In case of war, the FC 
NWFP has a secondary role of supporting the Pakistan army. Historically, due to its 
isolation and inattention from the central government, the FC NWFP has lacked training 
and quality equipment. This negligence remained manageable until the FC was 
confronted with Pakistan’s present threats. Not surprisingly, the FC NWFP troops have 
not fared well in numerous recent engagements with terrorists, and have suffered 
hundreds of causalities, particularly at the outset of the recent troubles.  
As a component of the FATA, Waziristan deserves special attention because it is 
here that the British forces met with their greatest resistance—and where history is 
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repeating itself with the Pakistan army today (see Chapter IV). According to Watteville, 
“no empire could ever subject the tribes of Waziristan.”54 The area continues to retain its 
original characteristics—the only differences being that those who were previously 
patrons during the Soviet era (Pakistanis and Americans) are now the victims of a 
‘reverse’ Jihad. The British remained engaged in this tribal belt from 1839 till they left in 
1947, but failed to bring these tribes under their total control. The British recorded 1,750 
raids into Punjab from Waziristan between 1911 and 1941.55 It is eerie to read the 
comments of the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in his official dispatch of 1 
August 1920, referring to Waziristan operations as: 
…of unparalleled hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a 
determination and courage which has rarely, if ever, been met with by our 
troops in similar operations. The character of the terrain, combined with 
trying and arduous climatic conditions, alone presented difficulties before 
which the most hardened troops might well have hesitated.56 
E. THE IMPACT OF DURAND LINE 
The demarcation of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has long been 
problematic, especially since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. To understand 
the background of the Durand Line requires a brief review of Britain’s involvement in 
Afghanistan in the early nineteenth century during the Great Game. After Russian 
successes against the Ottomans and Persians in the late 1820s, the British government in 
England began to worry about the northern frontier of India.57 The British feared that 
Russian consolidation along the Hindu Kush would grant it dominance over Central 
Asian trade and enable it to threaten invasion and incite rebellion in the sub-continent 
against the British.58Thus, began the British involvement with the NWFP, its tribal belt, 
and Afghanistan, leading to unending wars.  
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In the aftermath of the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878–79), the British wanted 
the North West Frontier demarcated as a defensive measure against the Russians. After 
considerable deliberation, the military and civilian leadership decided to place the borders 
where they are today, as this allowed Britain to retain control of the strategic passes 
connecting India with Afghanistan. Accordingly, in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand 
concluded an agreement with Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan, fixing the present 
boundary line.59 This dividing line came to be known as the Durand Line.  
 
Figure 6.   The Durand Line and Afghanistan’s claim up to the western bank of 
the Indus River in Pakistan. 60 
The unfortunate aspect of this line is that it split the Pashtuns. According to 
Roberts, “whether viewed from the perspective of regional economies, ethnography, or 
basic geography, the line seems illogical,”61 thus, making it virtually impossible to 
administer effectively on either side.  Nevertheless, the Durand Line also represents a 
classic example of the British policy of “divide and rule.”  According to a clause in the 
agreement:  
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The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the 
territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His 
Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories 
lying beyond this line on the side of India.62 
The year 1947 marked a turning point in the history of the tribal areas as a new 
and independent state of Pakistan replaced the British colonialists. Unfortunately, 
immediately after partition in 1947, Afghanistan announced the abrogation of all treaties 
with British India and challenged Pakistan’s legitimacy.63 Afghanistan was the only 
country to challenge the creation of Pakistan in the UN. This hostility continues even 
today as Afghanistan has not recognized the Durand Line and claims territory inside 
Pakistan, up to the western bank of the Indus River—in other words over 50% of 
Pakistan’s territory.  
Overlaid with the claim on territory is the issue of Pashtunistan. According to 
some elite Afghans, Pashtuns are one nation and need to be united under Afghanistan, not 
Pakistan. Indeed, President Daud of Afghanistan once stated that the “British did a wrong 
many years ago, and we have been fighting to rectify it. Until that is done, the struggle 
will continue.”64 Consequently, the Durand line remains little more than a disputed line 
on the map, having no significance on the ground. Worse, a clause in the Durand 
agreement, referring to what are known as “easement rights,” allows the Pashtun tribes 
cross-border transit for social and commercial activities—a practice much in vogue even 
today.65 This one agreement between both countries is a major hurdle in regulating the 
border security, which is being exploited by the terrorists on either side.   
F. CONCLUSION 
From start to finish, American leaders remained catastrophically ignorant 
of Vietnamese history, culture, values, motives and abilities. 
Misperceiving both its enemy and its ally, and imprisoned in the myopic 
conviction that sheer military force could somehow overcome adverse 
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circumstances, Washington stumbled from one failure to the next in the 
continuing delusion that success was always just ahead.66—Arnold Isaacs. 
In order to find a respectable solution to the conflict, it is exceedingly important 
for coalition forces to first understand Afghanistan and the region as a whole or else, 
unfortunately, their fate may not be different from that of previous invaders of 
Afghanistan. The U.S. must not repeat the mistakes it committed in Vietnam and learn 
from the mistakes committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan. By abandoning Afghanistan 
earlier in the post-Soviet withdrawal period, the U.S. allowed Afghanistan to become a 
safe haven for extremists and terrorists—a mistake, the U.S. cannot afford to repeat.  
For Pakistan’s part, meanwhile, there is much that needs to be done to overcome 
growing domestic extremism. In an age when the sovereignty of a nation state lies in 
well-defined boundaries, good governance, and effective law and order, a nation can ill 
afford its territories to remain under-governed or be used as safe havens for terrorism and 
crime. In view of the FATA’s history and peculiar tribal character, bringing normalcy to 
the FATA will be a long haul with no “quick fix” solutions. For more than sixty years, 
the FATA has suffered from the central government’s acts of deliberate omission. Having 
relegated the tribes to neglect and exploited for Jihad, it is about time Pakistan now 
rectify its past mistakes by taking firm and visible measures that demonstrates the 
country’s seriousness about reforming governance in these under-governed areas. As an 
urgent step, the FATA must be integrated into mainland Pakistan by merging it into 
NWFP, opening it to political discourse, and extending the writ of Pakistan’s constitution 
into the FATA. These steps will automatically mitigate the existence of safe havens in the 
FATA. Next, Pakistan must reform its education system which will help counter 
extremist ideologies spreading from unregulated madrassas. The madrassas must be 
placed under strict state control, and monitoring systems established, to deny any one of 
them being used for indoctrinating Jihad.  
Since Partition in 1947, Pak-Afghan relations have been bumpy. The politics of 
Pashtun ethnicity in Afghanistan and nationalism transcend the two countries mutual border, 
which are serious threats to the integrity of Pakistan. Thousands of people with virtually 
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identical ethnic backgrounds cross the border at over 300 frequented and unfrequented border 
crossings each day, legally permitted by the easement rights. There is no way to distinguish 
among terrorists, refugees, and local tribal people crossing the border. This is made still more 
difficult by the lack of proper border security mechanisms, particularly on the Afghan side. 
Thus, the status-quo on the border remains no kind of status quo, but a constant destabilizing 
factor for both states. Previously, the Soviet Union and India have exploited the ethnic 
cleavages and vulnerability of the border for their own geopolitical agenda. This is yet 
another reason why it is important for the international community to come together and 
work in unison with Pakistan and Afghanistan to settle the Durand Line issue once and for 
all. Not only would such a settlement have a long-term stabilizing impact regionally, but 
it would deny the use of these under-governed spaces to terrorists who represent a 
menace to the world.   
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III.  THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN  
Over the last few decades, regular armed forces—including some of the 
largest and best—have repeatedly failed in numerous low-intensity 
conflicts where they seemed to hold all the cards. This should have caused 
politicians, the military, and their academic advisors to take a profound 
new look at the nature of war in our time; however, by and large no such 
attempt at reevaluation was made. 
—Martin Van Creveld67 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An insurgency is an internal conflict, which can be easily exploited by external 
actors. As per McCormick, “An insurgency is primarily a struggle for power (over a 
political space) between a state (or an occupying power) and one or more popularly based 
challengers.”68 The aim of insurgents is to seize power from the existing authority or split 
the country. History demonstrates that once the social structure in a country or a society 
crumbles, the power vacuum created will be filled by non-state actors, which often leads 
to a subsequent revolt.  
Broadly, insurgencies can be categorized into two major forms: national and 
liberation insurgencies.69 In the case of a national insurgency, the competitors are a 
legitimate government and the insurgent. In the case of liberation insurgencies, the 
insurgents are pitted against a government that is perceived to be a puppet of a foreign  
occupation force. The insurgents’ objective in the second case is to liberate their nation 
from foreign occupation and dislodge the regime that is furthering the occupier’s cause.   
To counter liberation insurgency is comparatively difficult. Not even the most 
determined information campaign can compensate for the negatives associated with the 
outsider status of a foreign occupation force. For the very same reason, smart insurgents 
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prefer to give their movement the appearance of a liberation struggle to maximize 
popular support and also achieve greater unity within their organization or networks 
(something we have seen with Mao’s revolution, the Mujahedeen struggle against the 
Soviets, and the current Taliban resistance in Afghanistan).  
Neither the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan nor the 
Afghan government can hope to win without having a clear understanding of the nature 
of the insurgency that has confronted them since 2002. Having gone through a brief 
history of Afghanistan and the FATA in Chapter II, this chapter will primarily 
concentrate on what makes the nature of insurgency in Afghanistan unique.  
B. WHY THE INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN IS PECULIAR 
Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; 
in British times at least they were apt to produce an after-crop of tribal 
unrest [and] … constant intrigue among the border tribes.70 
Two facts are worth remarking. First, the U.S. and NATO have not been able to 
achieve their objectives against the Taliban despite having a remarkable edge in resources 
and technology. Reliance on “kinetics” alone has failed to crush the insurgency that suggests 
that there must be something different about the local people that they are willing to struggle 
on against such odds, which is one reason to learn more about them. Second, COIN is always 
supposed to be more about people and less about kinetics. The kinetics achieved what was 
initially intended—removal of the Taliban—long ago. Thereafter, the battle to win meant 
winning over the people.     
Afghanistan possesses all the necessary prerequisites for an ideal insurgency as 
outlined by David Galula, a famous French COIN expert. These are: a perfect cause, ideal 
geographic conditions, the weakness of the state, and foreign support. 71  The existence of 
ideal conditions and a few additional factors such as persistent regional disputes, the 
geostrategic significance of the region due to oil and gas in Central Asia, a deficit of trust as 
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well as differences among the allies waging war in Afghanistan, and the U.S.’s recent image 
in the world makes the insurgency in Afghanistan peculiar and extremely complex.  
1. A Perfect Cause 
The most important cause for insurgents’ purposes is one that attracts the largest 
number of supporters and repels the minimum number of opponents.72 Because liberating 
Afghanistan from foreign occupation is in line with Afghan traditions, it is an ideal ‘just 
cause.’ Although the goals and objectives of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are different, 
treating both as one has unified them against ISAF. Unlike al-Qaeda, which has a global 
agenda, the Taliban have so far not demonstrated such ambitions and are resisting foreign 
occupation in true Afghan spirit. While ISAF and the Afghan government remain 
indifferent to ground truths, the dominant factor in the insurgency and to some extent the 
civil war is “Pashtun nationalism.” The Taliban are portraying themselves as defenders of 
the Pashtun cause, defenders who are engaged in a just struggle to oust the foreigners, 
and defenders bent on reviving Pashtun rule and lost honor in Kabul. It is important to 
remember: the Pashtuns had ruled Afghanistan for over 300 years until they were ousted 
by minority ethnic groups with foreign support.73  
The Taliban represent a relatively homogenous movement compared to the seven-
party alliance of the Mujahedeen that was forged to fight the Soviets in the 1980s. The 
Taliban are pre-eminently Pashtun (the single largest ethnic group in Afghanistan). 
Mullah Omar is the unchallenged leader of the Islamist movement—at the moment there 
is hardly an alternative who could rise and compete for the Taliban leadership. In order to 
prove his religious legitimacy, Mullah Omar wore the holy cloak (no evidence of its 
authenticity) of Prophet Muhammad in 1996 in a public gathering after which the public 
declared him the Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful).74 The rise of the movement 
was as a result of strife between the warlords and the vacuum created in the war-torn 
population in the post-Soviet period, which was filled by the madrassa-educated Taliban. 
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The theological basis of the Taliban movement continues to provide the present struggle 
the legitimacy of holy Jihad against foreign occupation. In reality, the Taliban movement 
can be best described as a blend of Pashtun alienation (giving impetus to nationalism), 
struggle against the American-backed Karzai regime, and a classic liberation insurgency 
to oust the foreign occupation from the Afghan land. This is where the goals of al-Qaeda 
coincide with the Taliban in Afghanistan, which is effectively using the Taliban to fight 
the foreigners by exploiting their Pashtunwali code and unorthodox Islamic beliefs. 
2. Geographic Conditions 
The role of geography is overriding in any Unconventional War. Afghanistan is a 
land-locked country with porous borders. The physical characteristics of a country play a 
significant role in insurgent conflicts and shape the strategy they adopt. Bard O’Neill 
explains the significance of the terrain in the Malayan insurgency as follows: 
It has been estimated that approximately 5,000 Communist partisans in 
Malaya were being hunted by 230,000 regular soldiers and police, but the 
jungle is the equalizer. In this jungle it took 1,000 man-hours for each 
partisan killed.75   
 
Figure 7.   Physical map elevation of Afghanistan.76 
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Small and developed countries are unsuitable for typical guerrilla warfare. Even if 
terrain is feasible for guerrilla warfare, the effect may be limited in a small state. In 
contrast, a vast and rugged terrain will make a state’s task of extending its authority into 
those areas exceedingly cumbersome. The Soviets were confronted with this predicament 
during their occupation of Afghanistan; the U.S. is now facing the same situation in 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan extends over 250,000 square miles, with 70% of its territory 
covered by rugged and high mountain ranges. Only 12% of Afghanistan’s land is 
arable.77 Ground movement is mostly restricted to the valleys, making it vulnerable to 
ambushes. 
Afghanistan is mainly dependent upon its neighbors for access to the outside world. 
The Afghan government and ISAF cannot sustain their war effort against the insurgents 
without cooperative neighbors, particularly Pakistan. This source of vulnerability for the 
Afghan government and ISAF limits their complete freedom of operations in Afghanistan. 
Eighty percent of ISAF cargo and forty percent of fuel requirements pass through Pakistan.78  
Uzbekistan has already declined any further support to the U.S.79 And Russia has the ability 
to stop overflights to Afghanistan via Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The only other land route 
is via Iran through the Chahbahar port on the Arabian Sea. However, given the nature of 
U.S.-Iran relations, this is a dead option.  
3. Weakness of the State 
An insurgency is a competition between insurgents and government for control 
over the civilian population, “which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims.”80 
There is no way that an insurgency evolves without there being weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities in the state.  Generally, there are four instruments of control available to 
the state against an insurgency: the political structure, the administrative bureaucracy, the  
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police, and the armed forces.81 Thanks to American patronage, the Karzai government 
possesses these instruments in theory. But in reality, all are dysfunctional at best.  The 
government’s performance has been dismal since its inception, and a source of 
embarrassment for the U.S., its mentor.  
ISAF’s inability to build up the indigenous capacity of the Afghan government to 
take over, or at least lead security operations against the insurgents and protect its own 
population, has proved the biggest weakness of the Karzai government. Total police 
forces recruited so far have reached a figure of over 80,000. However, less than 30 
percent of this force is capable of performing independently.82 General Stanley 
McChrystal wants to double Afghan National Police (ANP) strength by the end of 2010 
to demonstrate progress in building indigenous Afghan security capabilities.83 However, 
thus far the ANP’s poor discipline and conduct have contributed to the insurgents’ cause. 
The ANP’s illegal activities include heinous crimes such as narcotics trafficking, bribery, 
smuggling, extortion, looting, and extra-judicial killings.84  
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is comparatively better than the ANP.  ANA 
training remains the responsibility of the U.S., which initially trained the ANA as an 
auxiliary force rather than as a force which could take over security responsibilities.85 
The ANA is mentored by U.S., British, and Canadian officers down to the company 
level.86 The employment of the ANA is “mutually” approved by ISAF and the Afghan 
government. However, the Afghan government has little control over its forces. The 
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ANA has five Corps with over 90,000 troops.87 General McChrystal wants this strength 
to grow to 134,000 by the end of 2010 in order to further strengthen the indigenous 
Afghan security apparatus.88  
After eight years, the ANA is not prepared to assume its responsibilities due to a 
lack of resources and organizational limitations—less than 30 percent of the ANA is said 
to be capable of an independent task.89 To some, the ANA has improved. They cite as 
evidence the fact that a majority of the 6,000 troops that participated in “Operation 
Moshtarak” (Together)—launched in February 2010 in Marja (Helmand)—reportedly 
belonged to the ANA.90 However, despite early claims of success by the U.S., the 
Taliban have “re-seized the control and the momentum in a lot of ways” in Marja.91 
Surprisingly, this has happened in the presence of U.S. Marines and after heavy monetary 
inducements to the locals.  
Confronted with these limitations, the U.S. has agreed with the Karzai 
government to bring back its ex-foes from the Soviet era to fill higher ranks in the army 
and the Ministry of Defense.92 The other major problem confronting the ANA is its 
ethnic mix. The Pashtuns, comprising 42% of the population in Afghanistan, fill only 
32% of the officer slots as compared to 56% for Tajiks.93 This is said to be one reason the 
recruitment of Pashtuns into the ANA has dropped to only 3%.94   
The other weakness of the Karzai regime is its lack of legitimacy. Afghan history 
reveals that legitimacy to rule comes from two sources: “dynastic (Monarchies and tribal 
                                                 
87 Afghan Index, October 30, 2009. 
88 Adams, “Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 
89 Afghan Index, October 30, 2009. 
90 C.J Chivers, “Coalition Troops Storm Taliban Haven,” The New York Times, February 12, 2010. 
91 Richard Opel, “Hurting US Efforts to Win, Taliban Disrupt Pay, ”The New York Times, April 3, 
2010.  
92 Yaroslav Trofimov,”U.S. Enlists Ex-Foes for Afghan Army,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 
2010.  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704533204575047352811767576.html (accessed 
February 10, 2010). 
93 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, 187. 
94 Ahmed Rashid, “A Deal with the Taliban?” New York Times Review of Books, Vol 57, No. 3, 
February 25, 2010. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23630 (accessed February 28, 2010). 
 34
patriarchies) and religious or sometimes both.”95 Mullah Omar tried to legitimize his 
movement, and then the Taliban rule through the later source. There is no precedent in 
Afghanistan for democracy as a source of legitimacy for a ruler. In essence, “the Karzai 
government is illegitimate because it is elected.”96 As Winston Churchill pointed out, 
“democracy can easily become another way of electing bad or ineffective 
governments.”97 Tellingly, the world treated Afghanistan’s August 2009 elections as 
meeting the standard for legitimacy. It is interesting to read an assessment like the 
following by the Center for Strategic and International Studies about the legitimacy of 
these elections:  
The election already is highly illegitimate and rigged, and will remain so 
regardless of the honesty of the voting process and the actual count. 
Karzai has spent months trying to exploit traditional ties and allegiances 
by buying bloc votes from ex-warlords, local leaders, and power 
brokers.98 
4. Foreign Support 
According to Galula, “no outside support is absolutely necessary at the start of an 
insurgency, although it obviously helps when available.”99 Outside support can only 
materialize when an indigenous revolution or insurgency has a well-organized local 
support system. The insurgents can only convert the inputs received from endogenous 
and exogenous sources (e.g., people, food, money, material, information etc.) if they have 
an efficient conversion mechanism (core organization) for achieving their desired outputs 
(activities).100 If the local insurgent system is effective, outside support can be a force 
multiplier, but not the only source of the system’s strength.  
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The “Afghan insurgency” is led by the Taliban as well as Pashtun nationalists 
who are located in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda collaborators find support in the 
neighboring FATA, Iran, Central Asia, Far Eastern Muslim countries, and the Middle 
East. But we also should not forget that the anti-Taliban groups (NA and the warlords) 
also draw support from the broader region. The traditional norm of meddling neighbors 
persists. The wide, porous, uncontrolled borders, and ‘interested’ neighbors create ideal 
opportunities for antagonists from throughout the region to use the situation to advantage.   
 According to David Kilcullen, “despite its importance as a terrorist safe haven, 
Pakistan is a problem, not the problem…Thus “fixing” Pakistan would help, but not 
solve the Afghan problem. The key to the Afghan insurgency lies in Afghanistan, not 
Pakistan.”101 In General McChrystal’s assessment, “While the existence of safe heavens 
in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistan’s 
cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active 
in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan.”102  
The ability of the Taliban to conduct deep and sustained operations, with a certain degree 
of population support, indicates that support from the FATA is not the mainstay of the 
Taliban movement in Afghanistan.  Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are both receiving funds 
from Arab countries, whereas the FATA only provides limited sanctuary, particularly 
since Pakistan’s recent army operations there (see Chapter IV). Significantly, foreign 
support to the Taliban is not as impressive as was the case with the Mujahedeen during 
the Soviet occupation. Instead, the chief problem is that the Karzai regime is far weaker 
than was the Communist regime in Kabul during the Soviet occupation.  
5. Regional Disputes 
 Stanley Wolpert, in his book Shameful Flight, has eloquently explained why 
South Asia is plagued with territorial and border disputes: the British left all sorts of 
bitter legacies when they divested themselves of their colonies. According to T.V. Paul, 
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“enduring rivalries” are defined as “conflicts between two or more states that last more 
than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship 
in between.”103 The Indo-Pak rivalry, primarily over Kashmir, is not only enduring, but 
asymmetric. That is what makes it unique. However, the asymmetric advantage India 
enjoys thanks to its sheer size, is countered by Pakistan through a balanced strategy that 
privileges tactics, alliances with the U.S. and China, credible deterrence in conventional 
and nuclear weapons,104 and use of its geo-strategic position vis-a-vis Afghanistan.  After 
the 1962 Indo-China war, India’s rivalry with China can also be considered an enduring 
rivalry. This factor adds to the complex politics and security in the region as India 
attempts to compete with China, a superpower in being and a reliable partner of Pakistan.  
The recent statement by the Indian army chief, General Deepak Kapoor, in which 
he asserted that India is preparing for a two front war with Pakistan and China, defines 
the nature of threats in the region due to these rivalries.105 The renewed escalation in 
tensions between China and India over the state of Arunchal Pardesh, currently under 
Indian control, helps explain General Kapoor’s statement. At the same time, it vindicates 
Pakistan’s view of India and the threat it poses, something the U.S. wants Pakistan to 
alter so that it will remove forces from its border with India and reinforce its (non) border 
with Afghanistan. What few seem to recognize is that Pakistan exists between a rock and 
a hard place given the enduring rivalry with India on the East and its turbulent border 
with Afghanistan in the West.  
Pakistan has had genuine security interests in Afghanistan and in the formation of 
its government, at least dating back to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Once President Zia-
Ul-Haq (a general who ruled Pakistan for 11 years) learnt that the U.S. was no longer  
interested in Afghanistan, his assessment defined Pakistan’s Afghan policy, which 
became little different from what it had been under the British Viceroys in India, or what 
it is today: 
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We have earned the right to have [in Kabul] a power which is very 
friendly towards us. We have taken serious risks as a front-line state, and 
we will not permit a return to the prewar situation, marked by a large 
Indian and Soviet influence and Afghan claims on our own country. 106  
The Afghan government, meanwhile, blames Pakistan for the existence of “safe 
havens” used by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the FATA, as well as support to the bloody 
Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan. The discord between the two neighbors runs 
deep, as we saw in Chapter II. For its part, Pakistan blames Afghanistan for its 
involvement in terrorism and militancy in Baluchistan and the FATA, in sync with 
India.107 Pakistan also sees the U.S. supporting a NA-dominated government in 
Afghanistan. In fact from a Pakistani perspective, it appears the U.S. supports all of 
Pakistan’s regional rivals. This renders the situation a strategic disaster for Pakistan.108  
According to Ahmed Rashid, “Kabul had suddenly become the new Kashmir—the new 
battleground for the India-Pakistan rivalry.”109 What drives this analogy home is that 
India, for its part, accuses Pakistan of supporting the insurgency in the Indian Held 
Kashmir (IHK) and for terrorist acts in India, such as those in Mumbai in 2008.  
6. Trust Deficit and Differences Among Allies   
There is a visible lack of trust among the allies in Afghanistan for a host of 
reasons. Pakistan does not trust the present NA dominated Afghan government, which 
has been historically anti-Pakistan and pro-India. The trust deficit in Pakistan-U.S. 
relations—a fact admitted by both sides—is another major challenge for bilateral 
relations and the war in Afghanistan.  
a. Pakistani Mistrust 
 According to Secretary Clinton’s statement during her testimony to the 
U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on December 3, 2009, “there is great deal of 
                                                 
106 Coll, Ghost Wars, 175. 
107 Irfan Ghauri, “Concrete Evidence of Indian Role in South Waziristan Found,” The Daily Times, 
November 03, 2009.   
108 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, (Viking: Penguin Group, 2008), 110. 
109 Ibid.  
 38
mistrust between the U.S. and Pakistan because the Pakistanis believe that the Americans 
betrayed and abandoned them in the eighties [sic] after Washington walked away when 
the Russians withdrew from the region.”110 The Pakistani mistrust of U.S. alliance is 
rooted in the fact that only it was left in the cold to fend off the after-math, the U.S 
abandoned and slammed sanctions against Pakistan for pursuing its nuclear weapons 
program in 1990. Pakistanis expected reward for their pivotal contribution in the Soviet 
defeat, and later disintegration, and not punishment, while its nemesis India enjoyed the 
fruits of the end of Cold War.  
 The Pressler Act regularized billions of dollars in aid by the U.S. to 
Pakistan during the Afghan Jihad.111 However, the same act was responsible for not only 
freezing the aid but implementing sanctions against Pakistan after the U.S. got what it 
wanted in 1989. Pakistan now fears a repeat U.S. abandonment once it is over with 
Afghanistan, despite recent approval of the Kerry-Lugar Act, sanctioning $7.5 billion in 
civilian aid to Pakistan over the next five years. To some, this seems a bit reminiscent of 
Henry Kissinger’s famous line, “In this world it is often dangerous to be an enemy of the 
U.S., but to be a friend is fatal.”112 
 In Pakistan’s eyes, the U.S.-India “strategic” nuclear deal similarly reflects 
U.S. bias towards India and the role the U.S. wants India to play in the region, despite 
Pakistan’s pivotal role in the Afghanistan war. Pakistan maintains that India is the threat, 
and is behind militancy in Baluchistan and the FATA through its consulates in eastern 
Afghanistan.113 Pakistan first brought up this issue officially in July 2003 with the 
Afghan and U.S. governments, accusing Indian consulates of having “less to do with 
humanitarian aid and more to do with India’s top-secret intelligence agency, Research 
                                                 
110 Sami Abraham, “U.S., Pakistan Differ on Drone Strikes in FATA,” The News, December 4, 2009. 
111 Between 1982 and 1990 Pakistan received $4 billion U.S. aid to enhance its security in the wake of  
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which threatened Pakistan as well.  According to the Pressler 
Act, this aid could only be granted to Pakistan after the U.S. President Certified that Pakistan was not 
perusing its nuclear weapons program before every annual renewal of the grant.     
112 Patrick J. Buchanan, “U.S. Ready to Dump Pakistani Allies?” BNET, November 10, 2009.  
http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/38594-us-ready-dump-pakistani-allies.html  
(accessed February 4, 2010). 
113 Sami Abraham, “U.S. Took up Pak Concerns on Baluchistan with India: Mullen,” The News, 
December 10, 2009.  
 39
and Analysis Wing (RAW).”114 Pakistan pointed to RAW-backed “terrorist training 
camps” at the Afghan military base of Qushila Jadid, north of Kabul, near Gereshk in 
southern Helmand Province, in the Panjsher valley, and at Kahak and Hassan Killies in 
western Nimruz Province.115  Afghanistan creates a sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma for 
Pakistan and India: 
Pakistan  
Do Not Exert  Exert 
Do Not Exert Neutral Afghanistan Pro-Pakistan Afghanistan 
 
India 
Exert Pro-India Afghanistan Proxy Warfare 
 
Table 3.   Afghanistan’s Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 Historically, India not only has supported every government in Kabul, 
with the exception of the Taliban, but it had previously welcomed, armed, and equipped 
Baluch insurgents, especially after the 1971 Indo-Pak war.116 Under these circumstances, 
when the U.S. is cozying up to India, Pakistan has reasons to doubt U.S. intentions, 
especially in the light of rocky relations in the past. In a recent statement the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Raza Gillani, was explicit on US-Pakistan relations, “We 
will not accept any discriminatory attitude towards Pakistan as on one hand civilian 
nuclear technology is being offered to India and, on the other, restrictions are being 
imposed on us. This is unacceptable.”117 Regrettably, the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal 
“ended up as an agreement by the 45 member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt 
India from non-proliferation rules that are supposed to remain applicable to all other 
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states.”118 From the Pakistani perspective, this represents a dangerous move by the U.S. 
Not only will this deal disturb strategic stability, but it will give added impetus to the 
arms race in this already volatile region, both in terms of conventional and nuclear 
weapons. As George Perkovich has written of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal: 
If states and attentive populations feel that this deal began because the 
U.S. devalued treaties and rules and wanted to build favor with its new 
friend India—in part to balance the power of its competitor, China, and in 
part to enrich U.S. companies—and other states went along with it 
because India is a big market, then the core principles of fairness 
necessary to sustain a rule-based system are undermined.119 
b. U.S. Skepticism  
 For its part, the U.S. distrusts Pakistan on three counts: Pakistan’s alleged 
support to militant groups, nuclear proliferation, and safety of its nuclear arsenal. 
Secretary Clinton, during her visit to Pakistan in November 2009, asserted that the 
leadership of the Afghan Taliban and of al-Qaeda are in Pakistan and “I find it hard to 
believe that nobody in your government knows where they are and couldn’t get them if 
they really wanted to.”120 Obviously, these allegations have been denied at every tier of 
civilian and military leadership in Pakistan. Pakistan continues to ask the U.S. to provide, 
or at least share, credible and “actionable intelligence” with Pakistan to substantiate the 
U.S. claims, which it has not done so far.121  
 Recently, the Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Ashfaq 
Parvez Kayani, made it clear “it is a wrong allegation against Pakistan that it has indulged 
in a double game,” further adding that “the casualties of NATO and allied forces in the 
war on terror were 1,582 during eight years while in one year alone, 2,273 officers and 
Jawans [soldiers] of Pakistan army were killed [including a three star, one two-star and 
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six one-star generals]; and 6,512 were injured.122 These casualties include 73 Pakistani 
intelligence agents. The recent arrests of Mullah Omar’s second-in-command, Mullah 
Baradar, and a few other senior Taliban leaders from Pakistan in joint ISI-CIA 
operations, speak volumes about Pakistan’s cooperation in trying to root out the Afghan 
Taliban.    
Expressions of distrust from U.S. leaders, despite repeated assurances by 
top Pakistani leaders, upset the Pakistani people and their armed forces, whose sacrifices 
in combating terrorism are second to none in the world.  According to some U.S. think 
tanks, Pakistan has maintained an ambivalent position regarding the Afghan Taliban, 
based on two suppositions: One, the U.S. will exit the region yet again after killing or 
capturing key al-Qaeda leaders, and two, the Pashtun Taliban would return to power in 
Kabul after the U.S. exits.123 The presumption is that since Pakistan cannot afford to have 
two hostile borders, it is in Pakistan’s national interests to have a neutral or a pro-
Pakistan Pashtun-dominated government in Afghanistan.  
 Regarding nuclear proliferation, Pakistan maintains that the principle 
architect of proliferation, Dr. AQ Khan, has been removed from the scene and remains in 
protective custody. From the Pakistani perspective, this is a settled issue as Pakistan has 
evolved stringent nuclear security and non-proliferation measures to avoid any recurrence 
of this problem in the future. However, Pakistanis believe that the U.S. was never 
comfortable with its nuclear program from its inception, which then became the major 
reason for estranged relations. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Musharraf 
expressed his fears in the following way: 
The security of our strategic assets would have been jeopardized. It is no 
secret that the U.S. has never been comfortable with Pakistan acquiring 
nuclear weapons, and America undoubtedly would have taken the 
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opportunity to destroy such weapons. And India, needless to say, would 
have loved to assist the U.S. to the hilt.124 
 Although, the nuclear issue is not directly related to the situation in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, certain analysts in the West and India fear 
that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists (Taliban or 
al-Qaeda) thanks to the unstable situation in the country. These analysts, having 
vested interests, paint unrealistic and dangerous scenarios with regard to the 
safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, which distract the world’s attention from 
the significant contribution made by Pakistan in the fight against terrorists in the 
FATA, as well as through its vital cooperation with NATO and ISAF in 
Afghanistan. They forget to explain how a few thousand extremists (at the most 
10,000) could, having no sympathy of the masses, prevail upon a moderate nation 
of 170 million Pakistanis that include over half a million members of 
professional, disciplined, and patriotic armed forces.   
c. Differences Among NATO  
 After all these years, ISAF’s goals and objectives remain murky, creating 
anxiety and frustration among NATO members. Canada’s decision to withdraw from 
Afghanistan by 2011, and the lack of enthusiasm displayed by other NATO members to 
enhance troop numbers in sync with the U.S. surge only points to internal dissension and 
insufficient resources and coalition partners for the protracted Afghan war.125 The 
collapse of the Dutch government in February 2010 over whether to pull out its 2,000 
troops from Afghanistan undermines the NATO alliance.126 This development happened 
at a crucial time, with President Obama’s troop surge in progress and NATO engaged in 
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major operations in Helmand (Marja). Apart from Americans, British, and Canadians, 
few other NATO members participate in combat operations. As NATO Secretary 
General, Jaap de Hoop says: 
…an honest assessment of Afghanistan must conclude that we are not 
where we might have hoped to be now. While the country’s north and 
west are largely at peace and improving, south and east are riven by 
insurgency, drugs and ineffective government…And the populations in the 
countries that have contributed troops to the NATO-led mission are 
wondering how long this operation must last—and how many young men 
and women we will lose carrying it out.127  
7. Geo-Strategic Importance of the Region 
Regionally, Afghanistan and Pakistan have immense geo-strategic significance as 
they provide access to Central Asia’s energy riches via the Indian Ocean. Apart from the 
war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, regional and international actors are vying to 
dominate the region to control these vast energy resources. The Caspian Sea alone holds 
the world’s largest untapped fossil fuel reserves, estimated to be between 50 to 110 
billion barrels of oil and 170 to 463 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.128  
The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to a profitable “new great game” 
of oil and gas thanks to which Central Asia “today is even a larger complex quagmire of 
competing interests.”129 This has resulted in powers like Russia, China, and the U.S., 
regional neighbors like Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and the CARs themselves, 
not to mention powerful oil companies competing in this game.130 Iran, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Turkey are primarily competing to host pipelines to pass through them. 
However, there can be no progress on the pipelines in the face of so many conflicting 
interests and the war in Afghanistan  
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Although the U.S. never recognized the Taliban formally after it took power in 
Kabul in 1996, a relatively small number of officials in the White House, CIA, and the 
State Department believed in the Taliban’s narrative that “they wanted to clean the 
Afghan mess to create a new peace.”131 Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel 
stressed at a meeting of the UN Security Council in December 1996 that all nations 
should engage with the Taliban for the sake of peace. The U.S. policy, as she outlined it, 
was as follows:  
The Taliban control two-thirds of the country; they are Afghan, they are 
indigenous, they have demonstrated their staying power. The real source 
of their success has been the willingness of many Afghans, particularly 
Pashtuns, to tacitly trade unending fighting and chaos for a measure of 
peace and security, even with severe social restrictions.132  
The only thorn in U.S.-Taliban relations remained Bin-Laden’s freedom to engage 
in operations from Afghanistan. However, by then “American policy in Central Asia had 
found another impetus: oil and gas.”133 Robin Raphel and many others in Washington 
believed that the Taliban could be useful partners in a new “Afghan solution” given their 
strategic location with Central Asia.134 According to another report, Colin Powell, as 
U.S. Secretary of State, announced $43 million in aid to the Taliban government in May 
2001 for its efforts to eradicate opium in Afghanistan.135 Despite the Taliban’s refusal to 
hand over Bin-Laden, who had launched numerous attacks against the U.S.—including 
the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa—the U.S. remained a major supporter of 
this regime only a few months before the 9/11 attacks.136   
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8. The U.S. Image and Foreign Policy  
The final factor that renders the COIN so difficult for not just the U.S. but other 
actors is what has happened to the image of the U.S. itself. The standing of the U.S.—“its 
position with respect to reputation, stature, or prestige in the world affairs—declined 
dramatically in the past decade.”137 This decline in the U.S.’s standing seems to reflect 
holes in its foreign policy, its inconsistent diplomacy abroad, as well as troubles at home 
exacerbated by an economic meltdown and increasingly unpopular wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.   
 A blunt and unconditional pro-Israel U.S. Middle East policy is a major reason 
the U.S. is increasingly unpopular in the Middle East in particular, and the Islamic world 
in general.  In a controversial book, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, the 
political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “warn that Jewish Americans 
have built a behemoth that has bullied policymakers into putting Israel’s interests in the 
Middle East ahead of America’s.”138India, inspired by the influence of the American-
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), has formed its own lobbying group in the 
U.S., known as the U.S.-India Political Action Committee (USIPAC).139 The influence of 
such lobbies in Washington steers U.S. foreign policy along dangerous paths, fueling 
charges of bias in the broader Islamic world—and providing al-Qaeda its recruits.  
 There is a great deal of public diplomacy required by the U.S. to improve its 
image and project “soft power” more effectively. According to Joseph Nye, “Power is the 
ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcome one wants.”140 There are 
many options for attaining desired outcomes from other states. A state can coerce others 
by threats, can induce them with rewards, or can attract or co-opt them.141 The prime 
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criterion of power remains ascendency in military, economic, and political capacities.  
However, not even this always guarantees desired outcomes—as the situation in 
Afghanistan makes clear. 
According to Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments.”142 Although Nye believes that the U.S. can 
achieve its goals through soft rather than hard power, he observes that the U.S.’s goals 
and objectives are at odds with those of the world in general. According to Nye, soft 
power is a challenge, but essential to help the U.S. achieve its goals through attraction.143 
The U.S. has to be able to convince skeptics and critics in the Islamic world that its 
intentions in Afghanistan and Iraq are benign.     
C. CONCLUSION   
The Taliban have the advantage of ideal insurgency conditions in Afghanistan. As 
Galula says, “the trouble is that the enemy holds no ground and refuses to fight for it. He 
is everywhere and nowhere.”144 The first law of successful COIN, according to Galula, is 
to acquire the support of the population.145 The same is suggested by McCormick in his 
Mystic Diamond model that securing the population should be the first priority of the 
state. General McChrystal rightly identified securing the population as the mission of 
ISAF in his COIN guidance, issued in August 2009. However, this assertion needs to be 
reflected on the ground as well. Unfortunately, that has not yet happened. Without 
encouraging legitimate and effective indigenous government and security forces, the 
coalition cannot attract the local support it needs. This is a fact, repeatedly ignored by 
most policy makers in the West with regards to Afghanistan—a fact which must be 
addressed for a meaningful outcome.  
South Asia has emerged as a serious security challenge for the U.S. in the post-
9/11 world.  A stable South Asia would not only help bring stability to Afghanistan, but 
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to Central Asia, too. However, it would be naïve to imagine progress on this front without 
significant progress being made on the core issues that sustain the enduring rivalries in 
the region. For this the U.S. should genuinely press India and Pakistan to settle their 
dispute over Kashmir, for instance, either bilaterally or through the UN or international 
mediators. Until core disputes like Kashmir are resolved, new disputes will arise and 
make everything more complicated as the belligerents will waste no opportunity to 
exploit each other’s vulnerabilities. To this end, U.S. policies in the region must be 
balanced—a tough call, but essential for a durable peace.      
All important regional actors, but particularly Russia, China, India, and Iran must 
be taken on board, as the U.S. moves forward on Afghanistan. At the same time, to 
prevent a nuclear conflict or an accident—and also to prevent conventional mobilizations, 
simmering low intensity conflicts, extremism and terrorism, and means to guarantee 
restraint are urgently needed—perhaps more so in South and Central Asia than any place 
in the world. As General David Mckiernan said in 2008, “this is a regional insurgency 
and requires regional solutions.”146 What he was alluding to was the complexity of an 
environment in which the U.S. can no longer rely on unilateralism or just a “coalition of 
the willing.”  
The enemy the U.S. is confronting may not only be al-Qaeda, but rather those 
conditions that motivated its creation in the first place (political and territorial disputes in 
the Middle East, and in South and Central Asia). Those conditions are what provide al- 
Qaeda with its strength and recruits within the Islamic world. If the U.S. wants to 
effectively succeed against this threat, then it needs to redraw its policy to prevent those 
conditions that provide the terrorists their support base. To these ends the time has come 
to free U.S. foreign policy from the tangle of powerful lobbies in Washington, so that 
policies are made that genuinely protect U.S. interests rather than someone else’s. One 
would hope to curtail the power of these lobbies, given the Afghan imbroglio and Iraq 
debacle, and the dire need to rebuild America’s image in the world—especially in the 
Islamic world. Ideally, this means being smarter about soft rather than hard power.         
                                                 
146 U.S. Congress. Members and Committees. Congressional Research Service (CRS). War in 
Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, R40156, December 3, 2009, 32. 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/r40156.pdf (accessed January 20, 2010). 
 48
















IV. THE OPPOSING STRATEGIES 
Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without 
Strategy is the noise before defeat. 
–Sun Tzu147 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The earlier U.S. strategy in Afghanistan was based on the “Bush Doctrine,” which 
can be summed up as three concepts: preemption, unilateralism, and military 
hegemony.148 This doctrine was adopted after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., and has had its 
staunch supporters as well as detractors. The critics of the Bush doctrine claim that the 
doctrine has isolated the U.S. and served as the apparatus for “American Imperialism.”149 
Fareed Zakaria expresses his views about the doctrine this way: 
Having spooked ourselves into believing that we have no option but to act 
fast, alone, unilaterally and pre-emptively, we have managed in six years 
to destroy decades of international good will, alienate allies, embolden 
enemies and yet solve few of the major international problems we face.150 
According to Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “Strategy is an actor’s plan for using armed 
forces to achieve military or political goals. Strategies incorporate actors’ understandings 
(rarely explicit) about the relative values of these objectives.”151 Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) was aimed at achieving one of the objectives outlined in the  
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comprehensive 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy—defeating al-Qaeda. However, 
after the removal of the Taliban regime over nine years ago, the U.S. is in no way close to 
achieving its declared objectives soon.   
As per the Mystic Diamond model, the population becomes the focus of the state 
as well as the insurgents in such conflicts. In order to win over the population, the state 
must exert to deny the information advantage to the insurgents as it possesses the force 
advantage. This is only possible if the state uses a right COIN strategy to employ its force 
advantage against a weaker but well informed and resilient enemy. Having reviewed the 
history and peculiar nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, we now turn to the opposing 
strategies of the belligerents. This chapter will focus on strategies on both sides of the 
Durand Line so that pertinent lessons can be drawn.     
B. AFGHANISTAN 
1. The Insurgents’ Strategies 
 Most observers use the term “Taliban” when referring to the insurgents in 
Afghanistan.  However, this is not a unified insurgency as it involves various independent 
groups. For instance, ISAF refers to these groups as comprising an “insurgent 
syndicate.”152 This syndicate includes the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Muhammad 
Omar, who is allegedly operating from Pakistan (Quetta Shura). Second, is the Haqqani 
Network, allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, allegedly operating from the NWA in the 
FATA. Jalal-ud-din Haqqani is an Afghan Jihad veteran who received substantial 
assistance from the CIA through the ISI against the Soviets.153 The third player in the 
syndicate, Hizb-i-Islami (HiG), is another old Afghan Mujahedeen organization led by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. HiG received maximum support from the CIA against the Soviets 
and was considered an important U.S. ally.154 HiG is also affiliated with the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda. The fourth set of players, which are mere a conglomerate, are  foreign groups; 
they play a critical role as enablers. They include al-Qaeda, which mobilizes foreign 
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fighters from the Arab world, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other Islamic 
countries to join the Jihad in Afghanistan. Similarly, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and 
Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Sharia Mohammadia (TNSM), which operate from the neighboring 
FATA and NWFP of Pakistan, are in league with the insurgent syndicate in 
Afghanistan.155 The table below provides rough estimates of insurgent strength and 
points to a consistent growth pattern over time:  
 
Insurgent alliance members 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Afghan Taliban 4,000 7,000 7,500 12,500 17,000 
Jaish al Muslimeen   1,000 750 Reabsorbed 
into Taliban 
Hizbe-i-Islami (HiG) 800 1,000 1,000 1,250 1,500 
Al-Qaeda   700 1,000 2,000 
Minor groups     200 
Operating from FATA                                       5,500 
Table 4.   Estimated insurgent strength between 2002 and 2006.156  
In 2008, David Kilcullen estimated the total effective strength of the Taliban as 
between 32,000 and 40,000.157 But also important, as the table above suggests, is the 
insurgents’ growth rate. A state cannot achieve much if the population is not protected 
against the insurgents; an insecure population will not provide the state with actionable 
information. The population only feels safe once the insurgents’ power has been broken, 
which is only possible with sufficient and sustained COIN forces present in the area.  
a. Al-Qaeda 
  In May 2008, then-CIA director Michael Hayden claimed the “near 
strategic defeat” of al-Qaeda due to the “successful” aerial drone attacks against al-Qaeda 
targets in Pakistan.158 Recent developments challenge claims of this sort, such as the 
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arrest of sleeper agent David Hadley (a U.S. citizen and rogue CIA recruit who was 
allegedly involved in the Mumbai attacks in 2008); the suicide attack by Khalil Ballawi, a 
double agent, who killed seven CIA agents in Afghanistan; and the attempt by 
Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight in the U.S.159 Instead 
of repeating a 9/11-type blow against the U.S., al-Qaeda is now thought to have adopted a 
“death by a thousand cuts” approach—focusing mainly on economic warfare.160   
 Among other things, al-Qaeda is intelligently exploiting the advantages 
that inhere in globalization by using carefully crafted propaganda on the  Internet to find 
and recruit people from western countries as the “ultimate fifth columnists.”161 Another 
dangerous element of al-Qaeda’s strategy, revealed by its chief of global military 
operations, Ilyas Kashmiri, is to hit Indian targets “to chop off American strength.”162 By 
targeting India, al-Qaeda can conveniently trigger war between India and Pakistan, which 
may drag the U.S. into the conflict. In response to a question during an interview, 
Kashmiri said: 
I will draw your attention to the basics of the present war theatre and use 
that to explain the whole strategy of the upcoming battles. Those who 
planned this battle actually aimed to bring the world’s biggest Satan [the 
U.S.] and its allies into the trap and swamp [Afghanistan]. Afghanistan is 
a unique place in the world where the hunter has all sorts of traps to 
choose from.163     
 The costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2009 
have been $255.5 billion and $733.2 billion, respectively.164 Continued U.S. commitment 
resulting in an even greater national debt may achieve Bin-Laden’s goal of bankrupting 
the U.S.’s will to continue prosecuting the fight. Al-Qaeda is succeeding in creating a 
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shortage of resources for America and her allies.  Since al-Qaeda needs relatively few 
inputs to carry out its operations compared to anti-terror organizations, it can potentially 
succeed by even more effectively using those that it has.  Considering the vast sums al-
Qaeda has caused the coalition to have to expend relative to its gains indicates that al-
Qaeda is waging effective economic warfare.   
b. The Afghan Taliban 
 Donald Rumsfeld suggested in May 2003 that war in Afghanistan was in a 
“cleanup” phase.165 Now, more than six years after Rumsfeld’s “optimistic” assessment, 
it is clear that Afghanistan is anything but a stable country and the cleanup phase is far 
from concluded. Troubling indicators like the free movement of insurgents in 
Afghanistan proves that the situation has deteriorated significantly. The goals of the 
Afghan Taliban are to: expel foreign forces from Afghanistan; undermine the Afghan 
government’s authority and perceptions of security; counter ISAF’s expansion by causing 
causalities; consolidate command and control, especially in the south and east; increase 
influence around the urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul; and establish a Sunni state 
under the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, Mullah Omar. 166  
 In order to achieve these objectives, the Taliban are pursuing a classic and 
time tested asymmetric warfare strategy—suitable for a weaker adversary.167 The 
successful tactics used by the Mujahedeen against the Soviets were known as “Dukhi” 
(painful). These were to avoid symmetrical combat, attack soft targets, attack government 
elements, harass logistics, and ambush and mine.168 These tactics could be interpreted as 
typical for “war of the flea.”169 ISAF faces two additional tactics these days: suicide 
attacks (both personal and vehicle-borne), and use of Improvised Explosive Devices 
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(IEDs) by the Taliban.  The Taliban may have spent between $20-45 million in 2006 to 
fund their campaign, but compare this to the $15.5 billion spent by the U.S. in the same 
year (the cost of killing a Talib was $15-16 million).170  
 The Taliban have gradually established organizational structures and 
shadow governments in the provinces. As per press reports (McClatchy newspapers),  
U.S. officials acknowledge that “the Taliban now have a full-fledged insurgency and 
shadow governors in 33 out of 34 Provinces in Afghanistan, including those in the 
North.”171 This situation has grown worse over time, with the number of Provinces rising 
from 11 in 2005, 20 in 2006, to 28 in 2007, and 31 in 2008, despite a gradual increase in 
U.S. troop strength during these periods.172 These shadow governments mainly focus on 
providing justice, which is desperately needed in the country due to the total failure of the 
Karzai government.      
 The Taliban have understood the importance of popular support for their 
cause. The Taliban have showed remarkable flexibility in engaging the local population 
and addressing their genuine grievances against the Karzai government. The issue of 
tactical Rules of Engagement (ROE) was addressed by the Taliban in their Field Manual 
in May 2009 (significantly, the ISAF commander issued his COIN guidance in August 
2009). Their ROE reflect their understanding of the importance of public support for their 
cause. For instance, some of the ROE outlined by the Taliban in this manual are: avoid 
civilian causalities and damage to their property; only “high value” targets may be 
selected for suicide attacks; Mujahedeen must behave well to win the hearts of the 
population; there should be no discrimination of the population on ethnic lines; enemy 
Prisoners of War (POWs) should be well treated; only Mullah Omar or a deputy is 
authorized to sanction executions; executions cannot be filmed; and enemy corpses 
cannot be desecrated. 173          
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 The Taliban are pursuing a relentless propaganda campaign as part of their 
information and psychological operations. According to British General David Richards, 
former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, “he never saw a more sophisticated 
propaganda machine than the one put together by the Taliban.”174 The Taliban grant 
interviews to journalists and use ‘night letters,’ usually hand written papers distributed to 
villagers or nailed to the walls and doors of mosques, schools and other public buildings 
in the villages.175 The Taliban also produce magazines, broadcast radio (Voice of Sharia) 
via mobile transmitters, and have a Web site (www.alemarah.org).176 The Internet is used 
to mobilize Muslim opinion worldwide to generate moral and material support for the 
resistance. It is also used to promote Pashtun nationalism against the NA-dominated 
Afghan government of Karzai. In their Internet magazines, the Taliban highlight the  
suffering of the Pashtuns: “Pashtuns are suffering everywhere; if you go and check the 
prisons, you won’t find any prisoners except Pashtuns; when you hear about bombings, it 
is Pashtuns’ homes that have been bombed.”177  
 The Taliban have a reliable mechanism for channeling funds to the 
insurgency. Mullah Omar is believed to raise funds through an existing network of 
Jihadist supporters from throughout the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East.178 
There are some who believe that Taliban funding also comes from relations with narco-
traders. This relationship, if it exists, may be a secondary source of funding as the Taliban 
have openly admitted that they receive money from Arab sympathizers.179      
 Asymmetric warfare remains the centerpiece of Taliban strategy. 
According to General David Barno, Commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 
2003–5, the Taliban is pursuing typical “Fourth Generation Warfare.”180 This type of 
warfare “uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to 
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convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either 
unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.”181 The Taliban is well aware that 
the Americans are impatient. Consequently, they boast, “NATO has all the watches, and 
we have all the time.”182 The winning strategy of the Taliban, as summarized by Gills 
Dorronsoro, is: 
On-the-ground observations and reliable evidence suggests that the 
Taliban have an efficient leadership, are learning from their mistakes, and 
are quick to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. They are building 
a parallel administration, have nationwide logistics, and already manage 
an impressive intelligence network.183   
 Predicting the impact and effectiveness of the recent U.S. surge and new 
COIN strategy is difficult at this stage given the type of COIN operations conducted by 
ISAF since 2001. 
2. The U.S. Strategy 
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that a 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the 
kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor 
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.184   
 After nine years, it can be said that the U.S. did not clearly think through its 
strategy in Afghanistan beyond removal of the Taliban regime. What next and how al-
Qaeda will be dealt with remain an open ended affair. The CIA-led Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) delivered the required blow to the ragtag Taliban in a matter of weeks. 
Roughly 500 U.S. SOF personnel participated initially in OEF.185 The task remained 
hunting down al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants even after U.S. conventional forces took 
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over.186 According to the Bonn agreement in December 2001, ISAF’s initial task was to 
secure the newly installed Karzi government. However, in 2003, ISAF’s mandate was 
expanded by the UN to help stabilize the whole of Afghanistan.  
 However, since it did not have any presence in provinces outside Kabul for the 
initial four years, and particularly not including those where insurgency was brewing, 
ISAF remained focused on securing the government.187 The U.S. had been pursuing 
Western style democracy, rule of law, and human rights in direct conflict with centuries-
old tribal and Sharia-oriented attitudes, which have become the source of destabilization 
instead of stabilization—contrary to Western expectations. 
Ideally, the U.S. military high command should have visualized the prospect of 
resistance and insurgency developing in the post-Taliban period. It then could have 
prepared comprehensive contingency plans in case the Taliban switched to an indirect 
approach. History should have served as a guide. According to Galula’s analysis of 
COIN, a direct approach could have worked against the Taliban only once the insurgency 
reached the “cold revolutionary war” stage,.188 The U.S.’s inability to act decisively 
encouraged the Taliban to advance the insurgency to the “hot revolutionary war” stage, 
which now appears to be growing beyond the control of the world’s mightiest military 
coalition.  
According to Kilcullen writing in 2009, “I would not suggest that our current 
strategy is ineffective: in fact, it is difficult to be sure that we actually have a single 
coherent strategy.”189 Kilcullen further says that there are different campaigns occurring 
simultaneously in various regions of the country, by different ISAF members and Afghan 
forces, pursuing different but simultaneous tasks of COIN, Counter-Narcotics (CN), 
Counter-Terrorism (CT), economic development, and reconstruction.190  
There could be four main reasons for the present situation in Afghanistan in the 
post-Taliban period—all attributable to a flawed U.S. strategy: insufficient military 
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resources dedicated to the post-war period; insufficient planning and resources for 
reconstruction and initiation of political processes within and outside Afghanistan; the 
revival of warlords191 and the narcotics trade with the backing of the Karzai government; 
and the Afghan government’s lack of an indigenous security capability to protect its own 
population.192 U.S. dependence on a corrupt and incompetent Karzai government is 
probably the biggest challenge the U.S. faces in Afghanistan. But also, instead of 
exploiting the early success against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2001, President Bush 
committed a strategic mistake by invading Iraq in 2003.193 While preparing for OEF, the 
U.S. leaders were already planning their next war in Iraq.194 Consequently, the means 
required to be concentrated in Afghanistan were diverted to Iraq. Kofi Annan (the former 
UN Secretary-General) responded to the Iraq War by saying, “Iraq was more than just a 
major distraction to Afghanistan. The billions spent in Iraq were the billions not spent in 
Afghanistan.”195  
a. The “AfPak” Strategy 
ISAF is not executing the basics of COIN doctrine. Thus the first major 
recommendation of this assessment is to change and focus on what  ISAF 
has the most control of: ISAF. The coalition must hold itself accountable 
before it can attempt to do so with others. –General McChrystal.196  
 The crafting of Obama’s “AfPak” strategy signaled the new 
administration’s focus on the region. This shift in policy was designed, in part to 
highlight how confused the Bush administration had been about its goals and objectives 
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in Afghanistan.197  Open ended war without a thought-through “end game” usually leads 
to a quagmire.  The salient features of Obama’s policy have been: a troop surge in 
Afghanistan to break the status quo; expanded diplomatic efforts inside (such as 
reconciling with the moderate Taliban) as well as outside (with Russia, China, and Iran); 
a special emphasis on Pakistan; improvements in U.S. and NATO’s command and 
control system; a counter-narcotics offensive (wheat seed will be offered to farmers to 
replace the poppy crop and if they refuse their opium will be burned); and economic 
development.198 Notwithstanding the Afpak strategy’s usefulness, it still has certain 
inherent limitations. First, this new term offended the Pakistanis, as people resented being 
lumped together with Afghanistan. Second, India, an important actor, has been 
completely left out of the scope of this strategy under strong pressure from India—again 
to the dismay of Pakistanis.  Thus, two of the main regional actors were not properly 
engaged from the start. 
 The new “Afpak” strategy grew, in part, out of General McCrystal’s 
assessment written in August 2009.199 This assessment outlined methods by which to 
support President Obama’s core goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-
Qaeda and prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.200 What this assessment 
signaled was that major changes would have to be made if an honorable outcome was to 
be achieved. The following excerpt from the summary highlights the situation in 
Afghanistan before the announcement of the  new strategy: 
The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be 
taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted 
in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is 
deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is 
also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—in both their government and 
the international community—that undermines our credibility and 
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emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is 
uncertain makes the Afghans reluctant to align with us against the 
insurgents.201  
 President Obama’s commitment of another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan 
will add to the 68,000 U.S. and 39,000 non-U.S. ISAF troops already there. According to 
the President, another 7,000 troops have been committed by U.S. allies for this surge, 
thus, yielding a total coalition military strength of some 144,000 at the peak of this 
phased surge. With this surge in troops, President Obama hopes to target the insurgency 
and break its momentum, and better secure the “population centers.”  
 Unfortunately, this may represent wishful thinking on the part of the U.S. 
military, as if the Taliban will come out of their holes or caves to contest General 
McChrystal conventionally, only to be defeated. Most likely, the Taliban will follow the 
time-tested asymmetric guerilla warfare strategy of exhausting the coalition. Eighty 
percent of U.S. and NATO casualties have been inflicted through the use of IEDs or 
suicide attacks in Afghanistan; the surge of 30,000 only increases the targets for such 
attacks.202    
 The flip side of this strategy is that it is also constrained by the President’s 
18 month-long timeline. Thereafter, the U.S. will start drawing down—an ambitious 
strategy, rarely if ever used if one examines military history. Historically, the average 
insurgency lasts fifteen years: For example, the successful British campaign in Malaya in 
the 1950s took twelve years.203 The timeline for successfully accomplishing the 
President’s desired goals has many serious implications—especially if one considers 
Afghanistan’s history of un-ending wars. The timeline provides the enemy with plenty of 
opportunities to adjust to America’s clock. The Afghan population sitting on the fence 
can see who is winning, and other stake-holders can plan their respective counter-moves 
with a degree of ease.  
 Ironically, what the Obama administration aimed to signal with its strategy 
was assured success. But what if the U.S. fails to meet the desired objectives in time? The 
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failure to meet the declared objectives will have immense political and military 
repercussions domestically, regionally and internationally—jeopardizing the entire 
mission. Unfortunately, too, the new strategy clearly overlooks support from important 
actors like Iran, Russia, and China. In this short timeframe, other issues affecting U.S. 
relations with these same actors will prevent them from extending their cooperation to the 
U.S. (see chapter V). Like al-Qaeda, all of them are likelier to “love the idea of America 
doing a long, slow bleed in Afghanistan.”204  
 Also, eighty percent of the Afghan population lives in the rural areas and 
not the cities.205 It is the rural population that acts as a “sea” in which the insurgent “fish” 
swim—not a few urban areas, which the new strategy aims to continue to protect. It is 
hard to imagine that ISAF can succeed in securing the rural population with this phased 
surge of just eighteen months. Securing an area implies clearing it first, and then holding 
it—to deny it falling back to the insurgents. According to Galula, the recommended ratio 
of military and insurgent forces is ten or twenty to one once the resistance reaches the 
guerrilla warfare stage.206 The French forces in Indo-China, for instance, never 
approached this ratio, “a fact that, more than any other, explains why the French could 
not have won there even if they had been led by Napoleon, regardless of the power of the 
nationalist cause initially.”207  
 The estimated Taliban strength of 32,000 to 40,000 would require some 
320,000 to 800,000 troops for effective COIN operations given Galula’s troops-to-task 
ratio estimates. The combined forces of Afghanistan and ISAF will be about 316,000 at 
peak surge (172,000 Afghans plus 144,000 ISAF), far less than those needed if the 
insurgents are close to 40,000 or more—and this, too, in a country like Afghanistan. The 
Soviets had around 120,000 troops (without having any of the problems of multinational 
coordination to contend with) and were faced with similar conditions, and failed in the 
end. The Soviets, like the U.S., mostly concentrated on Afghanistan’s few urban areas, 
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leaving the rural population—about eighty percent of the total—insecure. The Soviets 
were then confronted by the fact that their rival superpower (the U.S.) threw its weight 
behind the Mujahedeen, whereas no such counterbalancing support exists for the 
insurgents in Afghanistan today—a huge advantage for the U.S. Being in the 
neighborhood, however, the Soviets did have the advantage of uninterrupted and reliable 
logistical support. In contrast, the U.S. is mainly dependent upon Pakistan’s land and air 
space for its thousands of miles’ long logistical trail to Afghanistan. 
b. Reintegrating the Taliban 
 Surprisingly, before the surge, some in the international community were 
advocating accommodation with the Taliban. This was spearheaded by President Karzai. 
General McChrystal has announced that the U.S. is ready to accept the Taliban in the 
government.208 The removal of the names of five Taliban leaders from the UN blacklist, 
at President Karzai’s request, before the January 28, 2010 London Conference represents 
a significant shift in the U.S. approach toward the Taliban. The U.S. and Karzai’s 
government have indicated their willingness to “buy-off” the mid-and lower-level 
Taliban in an effort to “re-integrate” moderate Taliban into mainstream Afghan politics. 
According to a Pakistan-based Afghanistan expert, Rahimullah Yusufzai (a Pashtun), this 
tactic will fail however: 
The term “Taliban for sale” and “pay for peace” are good for creating a 
dramatic effect, but such words don’t explain the reality. It is possible that 
the Taliban would face big human and material losses and lose control of 
their strongholds as the ‘surge’ intensifies and money is doled out to 
recruit anti-Taliban militias, but none should expect them to surrender, 
sell-off their souls en masse or agree to a peace and power-sharing accord 
that clashes with their goals and principles.209  
 At the same time Pakistan is being asked to extend operations in the North 
Waziristan Agency (NWA) against the suspected Haqqani network and Quetta Shura. Yet 
ironically, Pakistan came in for severe criticism when its government signed deals with 
the TTP to achieve peace in Pakistan. This is a classic example of a double standard. 
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Worse, before this public offer of reintegration, the U.S. had already conducted a round 
of negotiations with the Taliban, mediated by the Saudis.210  
 Prior to continuing down this path of trying to co-opt the “moderate” 
Taliban, it is critical to accurately assess the likely “splits” in the Taliban movement and 
among their allies, especially with al-Qaeda. As of today there are no clear indicators that 
there are any splits. Negotiations with the Taliban at this stage and under the current 
circumstances would amount to little more than ‘appeasement.’  
 Another important variable that needs to be considered is whether the 
Taliban are expansionist or not. If they come to power again will they conduct 
themselves in the same fashion as they did prior to their removal? Will they promote the 
Jihadists and protect al-Qaeda?  If the answer to these questions is ‘affirmative,’ then the 
only option is to continue the fight—but not necessarily by military means alone.211 
Instead, it may be time to pursue political reconciliation inside and outside of 
Afghanistan by accepting the role of other actors in the conflict. Even to secure some 
modicum of domestic reconciliation, the Afghan government needs to do so from a 
position of strength; it must gain sufficient domestic legitimacy within Afghanistan if it 
hopes to force the Taliban to have to talk.   
 Unfortunately, America’s 18 month-long timeline is insufficient to reach a 
position of strength against a determined and tested enemy.  According to General 
Kayani, it will take a minimum of four years to prepare the ANA and ANP to be able to 
perform their respective duties, provided the international community stays committed 
after the U.S. starts thinning out its forces in 2011.212 The Taliban are aware of Western 
exhaustion and the U.S. public’s impatience, which has only increased their resolve. 
 Instead of working on buying-off moderate Taliban—again a short-term 
and questionable approach—it would be more prudent to work on re-conciliation with the 
Taliban. The buying-off policy has already fallen apart after “Operation Moshtarak” in 
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Marja. As Major James Coffman (Sixth Marine, Third Battalion) confirmed, “the Taliban 
are everywhere,” and “they have completely paralyzed folks here.”213 Due to this, 
payments to the locals have been hampered and are proving ineffective. 
 The Pashtuns and Taliban are a reality in and of Afghanistan without 
whom sustainable peace cannot be achieved. Toward that end, Ahmed Rashid has 
suggested a number of useful steps which should be taken: all neighbors and important 
actors need to be convinced about reconciliation with the Taliban for it to work, to 
include the Afghan government first and foremost. Names of Taliban leaders from the 
UNSC’s terrorist list issued in 2001 should be removed provided there is sufficient 
assurance that these leaders have broken ties with al-Qaeda and renounced violence. 
There should be a UN mandate for the Afghan government to negotiate with the Taliban.  
NATO and Afghan forces should offer assurances that Taliban and their families can 
return safely to Afghanistan (achieved via UNHCR and ICRC). Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia should be encouraged to facilitate this process and convince the Taliban to form a 
legal political party, like Hikmatyar’s HiG.  Saudi Arabia or some other neutral venue 
should host negotiations between the Afghan government and NATO. 214  
 According to Professor Siddieq Noorzoy, Director of Afghanistan 
Research International in the U.S., the U.S. policy needs an immediate change, as 
kinetics and the killing of Afghan civilians will only further inflame the Afghan 
resistance: 
President Obama’s statement that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan 
will not be open ended is a clear sign for many things to change given his 
deadline of July 2011 for troop withdrawal. We worry about the immense 
problems that are regularly reported by the Afghan television and print 
media and the lack of direction for solving them. The need for the change 
in policy from war to peace is now, not 18 months from now.215  
Bearing in mind history and its nine years of experience in Afghanistan, the U.S. must 
realize that ultimately it is the Afghans who should determine their future.  Meanwhile, 
                                                 
213 Opel, “Hurting US Efforts to Win Minds.” 
214 Rashid, “A Deal with the Taliban?” 
215 Noorzoy, Interview.    
 65
without taking into account the rights of Pashtuns, the majority ethnic group, no form of 
foreign-backed government will survive after ISAF pulls out. There is a pressing need for 
the U.S. to help the Afghans convene a Grand Jirgah as per their traditions. The U.S. 
should facilitate and back this—but then allow the Afghans to develop solutions to their 
problems. Of course, this proposed Jirgah must also have the support of all other 
interested regional and international actors, as well.      
C. PAKISTAN 
 Since gaining Independence in 1947, Pakistan has confronted several militant and 
insurgent movements due to unsettled borders with India and Afghanistan. These include: 
the Baluch insurgencies (1947, 1958−59, 1963−69, 1973−77), the Pashtun nationalist 
movement (1950–1970), the Sindhi (Sindhudesh) movement (1970s), the Bengali 
insurgency (1971), the Mohajir movement in Karachi (1990s) and the ongoing 
insurgencies in Baluchistan and the FATA post-9/11.216 What these reflect is that 
Pakistan has never been at ease and has had good reason to be constantly wary of internal 
as well as external threats. In 1971, India-sponsored Bengali (Mukti Bahini) insurgents 
helped defeat the Pakistan army. The Indian army’s intervention then resulted in the 
creation of Bangladesh out of East Pakistan. The creation of Bangladesh is a rare 
example of open external support and aggression paving the way to insurgent success.  
The tragedy in this for Pakistan is that Pakistan used a flawed “coercive” or “out-
terrorize-the-terrorist” policy instead of dealing with the problem via constitutional and 
political measures.217 Unfortunately, Pakistan failed to learn from this tragedy and 
continues to suffer from similar internal problems.   
Pakistan’s national security strategy is a product of the country’s creation, its 
multiethnic population, and its perceptions of who threatens it geostrategically.218 To 
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preserve its integrity, Pakistan has fought more often against internal enemies than with 
India—with whom it has fought three major wars and countless skirmishes along the 
disputed Kashmir border. Consequently, Pakistan is a security conscious state—always 
under threat from internal and external forces, vulnerable to religious extremism, 
dependent upon the U.S., China, and the Middle East for military and economic 
assistance, and with a shaky political system.219    
1. Strategy of Pakistani Taliban  
Notably, there were neither Taliban nor any significant network of al-Qaeda in the 
FATA or anywhere else in Pakistan prior to the launching of OEF. Suicide attacks in 
Pakistan only began in 2005, three years after the invasion of Afghanistan.220 As the U.S. 
decided to invade Afghanistan, Pakistan feared that the war there would push the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda to the FATA, which would then drag Pakistan into the conflict. This would 
pit Pakistan against its own population in the FATA—a vulnerability that Pakistan’s 
enemies could then exploit to their maximum. All of this has since come to pass. The 
home grown terror network, TTP, has paralyzed Pakistan since its inception in 2007.221 
The TTP was formed by leaders of some 40 militant groups, all having different 
agendas.222 The TTP was initially led by Baitullah Mehsud from South Waziristan 
Agency (SWA) until his death in August 2009 in a U.S. drone attack, and then by his 
deputy, Hakimullah Mehsud, who was also reportedly killed in a similar strike later.  
The TTP has links with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, as well as with Punjab-
based Jihadi outfits like Jaish-e-Muhammad.223 This deadly network operates from the 
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FATA and NWFP, with reach into mainland Pakistan. The TTP is primarily engaged in 
combating the Pakistan army and the state due to Pakistan’s support of the U.S. in 
Afghanistan. The objectives of the TTP are to:  enforce Sharia; unite against NATO 
forces in Afghanistan and perform defensive Jihad against the Pakistan army; react 
strongly if military operations continue in Swat and the FATA; ensure demand 
abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA; and secure the release of Lal-
Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz. 224  
The TTP has taken the battle to the Pakistani mainland and is responsible for most 
of the recent terrorist activity there, including the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto, the Marriott Hotel bombings, and the attacks on the General 
Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army in November 2009. Its attacks increased after 
the Pakistan Army went into the TNSM stronghold in Swat in April 2009 and then SWA 
in October 2009, which is where the TTP was headquartered, did its training, and 
indoctrinated suicide bombers. The increased intensity of terror attacks and causalities 
during the army’s military operations against the terrorists in Swat and the FATA reflects 
the TTP’s strategy of countering military operations against it. The resultant violence in 
Pakistan reveals Pakistan’s vulnerability and the price it is paying for its partnership with 
the U.S. The other elements of the TTP’s strategy are almost identical to those of the 
Afghan Taliban.  
The TTP’s terrorism largely targets the Pakistani state security apparatus (armed 
forces, intelligence agencies, FC NWFP, and Police) in operational as well as settled 
areas, and pro-government leaders in the NWFP and the FATA. In at least one way, the 
Afghan Taliban is different from its TTP collaborator; the Afghan Taliban have changed 
their ways and are conscious of the importance of public support. The Pakistani Taliban, 
on the other hand, are not at all bothered about public support and are targeting civilians 
and security forces alike. The Afghan Taliban might have a “just” cause for their struggle 
against foreign occupation; in contrast, the Pakistani Taliban have no such cause. Nor do 
they enjoy any support in Pakistan given their acts of terrorism, and their unorthodox and 
myopic religious beliefs. Because of this, skeptics in Pakistan believe that the TTP has 
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only one agenda, which is dictated and sponsored from outside: to destabilize Pakistan 
and demoralize its public through senseless acts of terrorism. An account of violence and 
resultant casualties in only six months of 2009 is presented in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Record of violence in six months in Pakistan in 2009.225 
2. Pakistan’s Strategy 
Pakistan got sucked into the Afghanistan conflict due to geography—just as it did 
during the Soviet occupation and throughout the history of Afghanistan prior to the 
partition of India. Pakistan’s main worry has always been India. Any development in 
Afghanistan that has favored return of Indian influence to Afghanistan could be fatal to 
Pakistan’s security due to their enduring rivalry. Pakistan also feared an Indian 
“misadventure” in Kashmir if it did not join the U.S.—knowing full well that India had 
offered the U.S. full cooperation after the 9/11 attacks.226 Pakistan thus proactively  
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pursued the elimination of terrorists and sought to deny the use of its territory through the 
effective articulation of a three pronged strategy of Political, Military and Development 
measures in the FATA.227  
a. Political Measures 
 Political measures revolved around the Maliks (tribal elders), PAs, and the 
FC NWFP. The army was present to supplement the political administration of the 
FATA. The PAs worked to revive the role of Maliks as those who could gather support 
from the larger tribal population against the terrorists. In fact, al-Qaeda, through 
psychological and monetary blackmail, succeeded in establishing “reverse control” over 
otherwise patriotic, tribal people. More than 120 tribal elders were murdered during 2006 
alone for opposing the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 228  
 The political processes put in place included several peace accords with 
the tribes attracted severe criticism from the U.S. There were four major peace deals with 
the militants: the first in Shakai in April 2004, the second in Sararogha in February 2005, 
the third in Set in NWA in August 2006, and the fourth in Swat in February 2009. 229 No 
peace accord ever survived. For example, the NWA peace agreement of 2006 did not last 
long after a deadly U.S. drone attack in Bajaur agency, killing 82 people, including 80 
children.230 This attack proved to be a watershed event for Pakistan. The incident sowed 
the seeds of anti-U.S. hatred among the tribes who vowed to join the Jihad against the 
U.S. in Afghanistan and fight the Pakistan army as well. Formation of the TTP in 2007 
can be attributed to this U.S. provocation—giving impetus to “Talibinization” in the 
FATA and NWFP. Slogans like “Down with America” and “Down with Musharraf” were 
shouted at demonstrations sparked by these attacks.231  
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 The fourth peace deal (the Malakand Accord) with the Swat Taliban 
(TNSM) was reached in February 2009 through ta raditional Jirga process.232 This peace 
deal had the approval of Pakistan’s national parliament on the strong recommendation of 
the provincial government in the NWFP. The government had agreed to allow Islamic 
Sharia courts in Malakand Division to satisfy public demands and not because it felt 
pressured to do so by the TNSM. In fact, the peace deal ended up being sabotaged by 
TNSM leaders as the Taliban started moving into the settled areas of Buner and Shangla, 
declaring Pakistan’s constitution to be “un-Islamic.”233 These excesses by the TNSM in 
the settled areas attracted severe public resentment, and enabled the government to finally 
use military force against them. By gaining public support in the Taliban’s home town of 
Swat, the government succeeded in achieving a major breakthrough against the Taliban 
in Pakistan. Gradually, the information advantage to the Taliban began to diminish in 
favor of the government, laying the foundation for the forthcoming successes in Swat.    
b. Economic Measures 
 The FATA has the most dismal economic indicators in Pakistan. Literacy 
is only 17%, compared to 40% in the rest of Pakistan. Per capita income is $250 against 
$500 for the national average, and 66% of population lives below the poverty line.234   In 
an attempt to demonstrate the state’s seriousness in developing the FATA, the 
government increased the Annual Development Program by 214 % from 2001 to 2002.235 
This effort was negligible, however, in view of the decades-long deliberate neglect of the 
FATA by successive Pakistani governments.  
 The Pakistan army became the engine of this development work. Within a 
period of three years, about 900 schools were built and textbooks worth $0.8 million were 
distributed in the area. 14,000 kilometers of roads were constructed in only two years and 
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work on 12 small dams was initiated for agricultural purposes. Similarly, projects on 
health were initiated by the government both on its own and with the help of NGOs.236  
 Beginning in 2006, the Pakistan government announced a nine-year 
development plan worth $2 billion with partial help from donors, including USAID.237 
At the special request of President Musharraf, President Bush pledged an additional $750 
million for development of the FATA over the next five.238 Another development effort 
pledged by President Bush was establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones 
(ROZs), which would offer duty-free access to U.S. markets for specific items produced 
in factories constructed in a ROZ.239 Since the ROZs required congressional approval, 
this plan is still pending, and the new administration has not shown any interest in 
carrying it through. Overall, the flow of funds can be said to be insufficient (only 30 to 
38% funds reach the FATA and its people on the ground) due to complicated procedures 
involved in trying to implement USAID projects.240 Also, while there is the widespread 
perception that the U.S. paid Pakistan $10.5 billion during the first seven years of its 
cooperation with the U.S., it is seldom recognized that over $5.5 billion of this amount 
included reimbursements.241 Pakistan, on the other hand, suffered over $34 billion of 
losses due to the turbulent situation in and with Afghanistan during the same period.242 
c. Military Measures (2001–2008) 
 Pakistan decided to support OEF forces inside Afghanistan by providing 
the U.S. crucial air bases and air space. The Pakistan army hurriedly pulled together plans 
to stop terrorists who might slip into the FATA as a consequence of the Tora-Bora 
bombing in December 2001. Unfortunately, this bombing, while spectacularly executed, 
lacked an articulated plan on the ground to trap Bin-Laden or Mullah Omar.  This proved 
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Pakistani fears correct about the expected influx of Jihadists toward the FATA. At that 
time, the border was thinly held by the FC NWFP only.  
 After some coordination with the U.S., elements of the Pakistan army 
launched its first ever military operation in the FATA (Al-Mizan 1) on December 11, 
2001 to occupy snow-covered mountains opposite Tora-Bora, using a few helicopters and 
animal transport.243 The “No Go”244 areas of Kurram and Khyber agencies were 
absorbed by the Pakistan army, after obtaining the support of the tribes. The tribes 
initially assured full cooperation with the army on condition that no foreign troops would 
be allowed to enter the FATA; there would be no aerial bombing, and no permanent stay 
in the FATA or construction of cantonments. However, the routes along the NWA and 
SWA could not be effectively blocked due to a paucity of time, resources, and lack of 
coordination across the border.  Across the Durand Line, meanwhile, no serious efforts 
were made by U.S. Special Operations Force (SOF) to cordon the bombing zone and kill 
the terrorists who were “smoked” out after the bombing. Unfortunately, the U.S. relied on 
the Afghan warlords instead—after heavy monetary inducements—despite the 
availability of sufficient troops in or near Afghanistan to execute this crucial task.245  
 In its report to members of Congress, the U.S. Foreign Relations 
Committee in the Senate admits faulty planning, while also acknowledging that: 
…the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed 
Bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract 
a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to 
finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course 
of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism. 246     
To make matters worse for Pakistan, thousands of people from neighboring FATA 
crossed over into Afghanistan to join the Taliban “Jihad” against the U.S.247 With nearly 
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300 kms of shared border, SWA became the hub for al-Qaeda and the Taliban as a result 
of this bombing.248 Within such short notice and such hurriedly conceived plans, the 
entire border with Afghanistan could not be sealed. In the best of times, this would have 
been an impossible proposition just given the status of this border. With the tribes’ 
support, however, the Pakistan army still managed to successfully net 240 al-Qaeda 
terrorists trying to flee the Tora-Bora bombing in December 2001—its biggest catch in a 
single anti-terrorist operation.249 The Pakistan army and the FC NWFP also gradually 
found themselves committed in CT operations in the FATA from December 2001 on—a 
task for which they were not trained, equipped, or prepared. Due to these handicaps, the 
Pakistan army applied the direct approach against the indirect approach of the terrorists, 
and suffered serious setbacks during its initial years in the FATA.  
The U.S. launched Operation “Anaconda” in Eastern Afghanistan in 
March 2002 in a renewed effort to arrest or kill al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders who had 
escaped the relentless Tora-Bora bombing campaign. According to the Afghan 
government and the U.S., these leaders had crossed into the Waziristan agencies of the 
FATA.250 Pakistan came under pressure from the U.S. to pursue these most wanted 
terrorists in coordination with the U.S. However, in December 2001, a few months before 
the U.S decided to launch Operation Anaconda, Pakistan’s anti-terrorist operations 
received a severe blow when Indian armed forces mobilized along Pakistan’s eastern 
border after a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. India held Pakistan responsible for 
this attack and threatened to invade Pakistan if it did not meet Indian conditions—taking 
the lead from the U.S.’s policy toward and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. The 
Pakistan army, despite its mobilization against the Indian threat in the east, launched 
Operation Al-Mizan-2 in NWA and SWA in June 2002 to support the U.S. across the 
border—virtually fighting a two-front war with extremely limited resources.  
 The Pakistan army adopted three fold to operations: effectively check 
cross-border movement; dominate the internal environment by saturating the FATA with 
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troops; and strike the terrorists’ hideouts and their activities through a helicopter-borne 
Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), comprising an elite Special Services Group 
(SSG) battalion of the Pakistan army as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).251 The specific 
technique adopted while approaching a suspected target in the FATA was “cordon, 
search, and destroy.”252 No serious efforts were made to “hold” these areas due to the 
hazards in maintaining any force in such a hostile environment, with such a vulnerable 
logistics trail—completely ground-based and deep.  
 Because Pakistan lacked the requisite number of helicopters for the SOTF 
operations, the U.S. was asked to assist. The U.S. response, according to President 
Musharraf, was too little and too late as the U.S. provided vintage (Bell) helicopters, 
which did not reach Pakistan until 2003.253 These Bell helicopters lacked night flying 
capability and were ineffective at high altitude—which comprised most of the FATA.254 
The promised Cobra attack helicopters also arrived late and in reduced numbers in 2008. 
Although the U.S. had also committed to reinforce Pakistan’s human intelligence 
capacity with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and other sophisticated technical means, this 
assistance also did not materialize for any meaningful SOTF operations.255  
 Despite these challenges, within a year the Pakistan army achieved major 
successes against terrorists in both Waziristan agencies. Pakistan committed over 80,000 
troops in various operations in the FATA during this period, establishing some 900 posts 
along the Durand Line.256The number of posts manned by Pakistan later increased to 
1,000 with just 84 managed by the ANA and ISAF on the Afghanistan side of the line. 257   
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U.S. troops gradually increased from 9,000 to 19,000 between 2002 and 2005:258 
However, the combined coalition strength reached 50,000 by 2007—yet most of this 
remained concentrated near a few cities.259  
 The Pakistan army launched operations in all the agencies, pursuing 
terrorists after breaking up their bases in one agency after another. Al-Qaeda’s 
sanctuaries were dismantled while hundreds of al-Qaeda members and their local 
sympathizers were killed or captured by 2006.260 In fact, 689 al-Qaeda suspects, 
belonging to 26 different nationalities, were captured—of which 369 were handed over to 
the U.S.261  Prominent al-Qaeda operatives arrested from Pakistan and handed over to the 
U.S. included Abu Zubeda, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Hafs Al-Masri, and Abu 
Faraj Al-Libbi.262 It has proved difficult for Pakistanis to see Pakistan continuously 
blamed for harboring top al-Qaeda leaders after having delivered leaders like those 
mentioned above.  
 A major offensive, Operation Sher Dil (Lion Heart), was launched by the 
Inspector General (IG) FC NWFP, Major General Tariq Khan, a Pashtun himself, in 
Bajaur in August 2008 to prevent the Taliban taking over Khar, district headquarters of 
Bajaur. This operation succeeded in breaking up al-Qaeda’s and the Taliban’s hub in 
Bajaur, laying the foundation for successful operations to follow. This operation 
succeeded due to the IG’s strategy: secure the population through patrols, create tribal 
lashkars (militias), support Jirghas and, most importantly, take concrete measures to raise 
the morale of the troops.263  
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 One disturbing fallout from the conflict in the FATA and Swat has been 
the displacement of about 3.5 million people from these areas.264 Such a mass exodus has 
not only enhanced security problems within Pakistan, but it has proved a drain on its 
faltering economy.   
d. Military Measures in 2009  
 After the provocative excesses by the TNSM group in the Swat Valley in 
April 2009, Pakistan launched its biggest military operation since 2001 outside the 
FATA, in Swat town. This operation, Rah-e-Raast (Righteous Path), was launched in 
May 2009 with support from the Pakistan Air Force, along with gunship helicopters, 
artillery, tanks, and SOTF. The total commitment of Pakistani troops in Swat and the 
FATA rose to 152,000. 265  Such a massive military operation in a proper, built-up area 
caused the evacuation of 2.5 million people from Swat before the operation.266 These 
people became Internally Displaced People (IDPs), which placed a huge political and 
socio-economic burden on the Pakistan government. According to Haider Mullick, in 
doing this the Pakistan army employed a new “hybrid COIN” strategy, “one that centered 
on a military institutional pride contingent upon political support and brought about by 
both protecting the population and interdicting the enemy.”267 
 This operation succeeded despite huge odds because of the care taken in 
executing it. First, the army used “corner, choke, and contain” joint air-land tactics that 
interdicted the Taliban at high altitude hideouts with Precision Guided Munitions 
(PGMs), forcing them to climb down from the mountains and find cover in mosques, 
schools, homes, and behind human shields268—enraging the local population. This 
improved human intelligence and political support for the operation. Second, the army 
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executed a “presence-oriented” approach: it systematically cleared areas, held them with 
small numbers instead of falling back to firm bases, enforced curfews, and assisted the 
local government to reassert its writ.269The Pakistan army has left behind 20,000 troops 
in Swat to “hold” it and prevent it from falling back to the terrorists.270 The Pakistan 
army killed 1,600 terrorists and arrested 700 before the operation concluded in July 
2009.271 
 Having effectively cleared Swat of terrorists, the Pakistan army launched 
another daring offensive in the SWA against the epicenter of Jihad in Pakistan—the 
nerve center of the TTP. Some analysts described this battle in advance as the “mother of 
all battles” in view of the colonial history of the SWA, as well as the army’s three 
previous embarrassments there in 2003, 2004 and 2008—all ending in controversial 
peace deals with the Taliban.272 Code named Rah-e-Nejat (Path to Salvation), the 
October operation involved over 30,000 Pakistani troops, and relied on the successful 
Swat hybrid COIN strategy with little variation. Three infantry Divisions took part in the 
operation.  
 This time the army completely surprised the terrorists by adopting the 
“ridgeline approach” and closing in on its objectives from three directions 
simultaneously.273 This meant that the marching troops avoided using the main roads or 
tracks and instead dominated the heights to secure the valleys before advancing further. 
This tactic was supplemented with reconfigured “C-130 aircraft with surveillance eye-in-
the sky capabilities” to ensure reliable intelligence—which acted as a force multiplier.274 
According to intelligence estimates, there were 10,000 hard core terrorists present, 
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including 1,000 to 1,500 foreigners, mostly Uzbeks.275 The army completed the operation 
within six weeks, successfully disrupting and dismantling the nerve center of the TTP. To 
the surprise of the Pakistan army, when the operation commenced, ISAF pulled out its 
several posts opposite the SWA, which facilitated some terrorists to escape. This issue 




Figure 9.   Three Pakistani Divisions clearing SWA from three directions 
(Operation Rah-e-Nejat).277 
  Several events turned the tide in favor of military action in the SWA: the 
successful Swat operation; the killing of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud; and the final 
catalyst, the terrorist attack on the GHQ of the Pakistan army in October 2009, killing 20 
(including a Brigadier and two Lieutenant Colonels), with credit claimed by the TTP.278 
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As in Swat, two key factors ensured success for the Pakistan army: unstinting 
government, public, and media support to the army; and evacuation of inhabitants of  
SWA prior to the offensive—thereby, giving the army a free hand to use heavy weapons, 
including the air force.279 According to the military, more than 600 terrorists and 70 
security personnel were killed by the end of this operation.280 The Pakistan army has 
already announced that it will now begin to consolidate the gains it has made in these 
areas by “holding” them and continuing its “build” efforts in keeping with COIN doctrine 
before opening other fronts elsewhere in the FATA.  
D. CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN: THE NEW U.S. “AFPAK” STRATEGY   
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship faces a series of challenges. Among these are: the 
need to stop unreasonable pressure on Pakistan to act; the impossible 18-month-long 
timeline; and the America’s penchant to discount the threat from India without resolving 
the core Kashmir dispute first. Both states must overcome the “on again” and “off again” 
nature of their bilateral relationship and turn this into a long-term strategic partnership—
the U.S. must also stop pressing Pakistan to accept large numbers of military trainers and 
advisors. And both countries must work to restore the U.S. image in Pakistan.  
Addressing these challenges is extremely important before the U.S. begins to 
disengage from the region in 18 months. Otherwise, the mess left behind will be like the 
mess created during the Afghan Jihad and in the post-Taliban period in Afghanistan, but 
worse, as it now involves a nuclear-armed state.  
1. Mantra of “Do More” 
President Obama’s new strategy is aimed at achieving a balance between those 
hawks who want to escalate in the war in Afghanistan and those who want a rapid 
withdrawal of NATO forces from the area.  The purpose of the 30,000 troop surge is to 
demonstrate U.S. resolve to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.  The Pakistanis, 
critical allies in the war, fear that an all out war given this surge will further destabilize 
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Pakistan, as the Afghan Taliban will definitely run towards the FATA, thus, creating 
conditions that force Pakistan to have to act. Pakistan is already under increasing pressure 
from the U.S. to extend its operations into the NWA against the alleged Haqqani 
network.281 Interestingly, Pakistan has done the opposite by announcing the cessation of 
military operations for the next six to twelve months in order to consolidate the gains 
already made against the TTP in Swat and the FATA.282 The unreasonable pressure on 
Pakistan to act or “do more,” which, according to popular perceptions in Pakistan means 
“do all,” needs to end.283 The world needs to understand the limits of Pakistan’s 
cooperation. As it is, Pakistan considers itself a scapegoat for a failed U.S. strategy in 
Afghanistan and a victim of the incompetence of the Karzai government.    
 2. Impossible 18-Month Timeline 
 After great effort and cost, Pakistan has partially succeeded in establishing the 
writ of government in most of the FATA, after more than two years of bloody war.  
According to General Kayani, “only when you win over 70% [territorial and population 
control], are you really winning.”284 To get to this minimum 70% mark, 18 months is too 
short a time frame in Afghanistan, where the Taliban has influence in 33 out of 34 
provinces. The disparity in control across the nominal Durand Line means the insurgents 
can slip from Pakistan to Afghanistan, just as they came from Afghanistan to Pakistan 
when hit hard by U.S. and coalition forces.  Both sides will have to agree on a uniform 
strategy—either to fight or to seek conditional reconciliation. Otherwise, the insurgent 
syndicate will continue to play them both. 
 3. Discounting India 
 Pakistan’s plate is already full with combating the TTP, reacting to looming 
economic and political crises, and worrying about the Indian threat of a two front war. 
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Recently, General Kayani observed that the Indian “Cold Start Strategy”285 is an 
aggressive strategy, which Pakistan can ill afford to ignore.286 General Kayani has 
explained Pakistan’s position on Afghanistan by saying, “We have made it clear to the 
U.S. that it will have to keep in view the interests of Pakistan before taking any decision 
with reference to Afghanistan.”287 Pakistan has offered to train the ANA and the ANP, a 
task presently being undertaken by the Indians with the American and Afghan 
governments’ blessings.288 A strong Afghan army (when it reaches its planned strength 
of 250,000) in concert with Indian influence in the west, will put Pakistan into a 
nutcracker situation when there is already an Indian army of over a million strong 
breathing down its neck in the east.289 Pakistan’s insistence on assisting the Afghans is 
not unreasonable, since Pakistan is a direct neighbor, which India is not. From Pakistan’s 
point of view, Pakistan should reap the benefits of the sacrifices it is making in support of 
the war in Afghanistan. India should not be permitted to benefit at the expense of 
Pakistan’s dirty and bloody work of fighting the terrorists. What confuses Pakistan is why 
the allies do not recognize this.  
4. Building Trust 
 President Obama has admitted that the U.S. partnership with Pakistan is 
“inextricably” linked to the U.S. efforts in the region.290 Consequently, the U.S. has been 
trying to assure Pakistan of its long-term partnership. Secretary Robert Gates, on his visit 
to Pakistan in January 2010, remarked, “...when the Soviet Union left the region and the 
U.S. largely abandoned Afghanistan and cut off defense ties with Pakistan—[that was] a 
grave mistake driven by some well-intentioned but short-sighted U.S. legislative and 
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policy decisions.”291 The commitment of $7.5 billion in civilian aid, over and above U.S. 
military assistance, and the provision of eighteen F-16s and shadow drones are important 
steps that demonstrate U.S. commitment. High-level talks and strategic dialogue between 
both states in March 2010 is another significant indicator of improved relations among 
these estranged allies.   
 From Pakistan’s perspective, it has always delivered results when it and the U.S. 
cooperate and work for their common interests; however, in return Pakistan feels it has 
been abandoned at numerous critical junctures by the U.S. Pakistan’s only grievance with 
the U.S. stems from the U.S.’s biased policies in the region. The growing Indian 
involvement in Afghanistan is creating a strategic imbalance from Pakistan’s point of 
view. The U.S. thus needs to do more to allay Pakistan’s genuine security concerns 
regarding India and in recognition of Pakistan’s (not just India’s) nuclear status—the only 
strategic indicators for Pakistan when it comes to a meaningful U.S. commitment. 
Understandably, the U.S. finds itself in a dilemma as it seeks to maintain relations with 
both nuclear armed rivals in the region while also protecting its own strategic interests.   
 5. U.S. Military Advisors / Trainers   
Another challenge is U.S. insistence that Pakistan accept U.S. trainers to 
overcome the lack of training of the FC NWFP in COIN. Pakistan refused to accept U.S. 
trainers for the FC and the military in 2008 to avoid any U.S. footprint or impingement 
on its own COIN efforts in the FATA.292 The U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) extends assistance to partner nations under its Foreign Internal Defense 
(FID) program, but these can come in a variety of forms.293  The Pakistan government 
has also resisted large numbers of U.S. advisors, or any large-scale military presence in 
Pakistan, because of its justifiable concerns over public outrage. Despite Pakistan’s 
resistance, the U.S. has nevertheless “managed” to assign a force of fewer than a hundred 
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trainers to the FC NWFP, which has led to a political backlash in Pakistan. The people in 
the FATA resent the Pakistan army—the American presence will only cause further, and 
potentially insurmountable problems for Pakistan army’s efforts there, and spoil the good 
will it had earned after eight years.  
The recent killing of three U.S. SOF soldiers in Dir NWFP from a vehicle born 
suicide attack has brought the American presence into the spotlight and people are 
questioning what business the Americans have in those troubled areas.294 Where those 
SOF personnel were killed was certainly not the training area, but one of the operational 
areas instead. People are wondering why the FC NWFP is being trained by the 
Americans and not by the Pakistan army? For instance, they wonder whether the role of 
the FC NWFP has been redefined from border security to specialized COIN activities? 
The Pakistanis have great pride and faith in their own armed forces, which are fully 
capable. What Pakistan most needs is the political, economic, and military support to 
combat the terrorists—not “foreign” advisors, as these will only complicate rather than 
contribute to the Pakistan army’s efforts in the FATA.295  
6. Improving the U.S. Image in Pakistan   
Improving the U.S. image among the Pakistani public is a paramount challenge. 
The major reasons for anti-American sentiment in Pakistan are partly historical and partly 
due to the ongoing U.S.’s drone attacks in the FATA.296  Any increase in the U.S. 
footprint, with simultaneous drone attacks in the FATA—whose frequency has 
dramatically increased since President Obama took the office—will only inflame these 
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sentiments.297 Pakistanis consider these aerial attacks to be a violation of their 
sovereignty. Worse, these attacks are counterproductive since 90% of the time civilians 
are killed.298  
These attacks also create serious problems for the Pakistan army and are a source 
of constant embarrassment to the Pakistan government. Certain officials within Pakistan 
believe that the drones are effective, but they are shy to admit this openly due to their fear 
of public outrage. The Pakistan government needs to stop being hypocritical, as this 
hypocrisy is harming it more than it is harming the U.S. Both governments need to adopt 
a method by which to employ the drones in the FATA in a transparent, coordinated, and 
joint manner. It is not right for the U.S. to take all the blame. Pakistan, after all, has 
demanded the transfer of drone technology from the U.S. However, until this occurs, 
better options for employing these drones must be developed.  
Because these attacks produce “accidental guerrillas” in large numbers, interior 
Pakistan has been struck by retaliatory suicide attacks, which in turn have adverse 
impacts on the political, security, and economic conditions in the country. The slain TTP 
leader, Baitullah Mehsud, proudly said in an interview that “I spent three months trying 
to recruit and only got 10−15 persons. One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers.”299 If 
the U.S. really intends to help Pakistan get rid of terrorism and extremism, then it also 
needs to fulfill the pledge by the Bush administration to establish ROZs in the FATA as a 
genuine goodwill gesture. Instead of ensuring that fragile and corrupt governments in 
Pakistan stay addicted to aid, it will be better to enhance trade with Pakistan, which will 
bring prosperity to the people of Pakistan, automatically countering the conditions that 
breed extremism.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Finally, the government should target the insurgents armed with specific, 
local information derived from long and close association with the 
population. Not rocket science—but if it were, western militaries would be 
better at it. Sadly, the military-industrial complex does not build many 
tools for fighting counterinsurgencies.300 
 The U.S. loses if the insurgents cannot be defeated or at least incapacitated very 
soon. This is the reality of guerrilla warfare where an insurgent is deeply invested in the 
long term struggle against the limited time line available to the occupying soldier whose 
actions are bound by democratic and political caveats. A strategy only functions when 
there is clarity of goals and clear understanding about the enemy. According to Steve 
Coll, “a Taliban victory would have devastating consequences for U.S. interests. But to 
avoid disaster, America must beware of the Soviet Union’s mistakes—and learn from its 
own three decades of failure in South Asia.”301  
 Most observers now believe that Afghanistan’s security largely depends upon its 
relations with its neighbors, most importantly Pakistan. Instead of a common belief that 
stability in Afghanistan is hinged upon Pakistan, though, the opposite is actually the case. 
The need to adopt a new “AfPak” strategy was one response to the fact that the earlier 
U.S. strategy lacked a clear direction, consequently creating space for the Taliban to 
regroup. However, given the explosive regional environment, the scarlet thread of any 
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan should be the one that does not destabilize nuclear-armed 
Pakistan any further. The U.S. must provide what Pakistan requires to enhance its 
indigenous capabilities (e.g., much-needed economic and political support, and military 
equipment) without any caveats, or without any fear of Indian pressure. To achieve this, 
the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan need to work, more closely than ever before to bridge 
their differences in order to find a meaningful solution to this protracted and bloody war. 
This can happen only if trust can be developed among these most important actors in the 
conflict, and only via the adoption of long-term measures and commitments.   
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 Ironically, a limited agenda in Afghanistan will not adequately address the 
challenges Afghanistan poses to U.S. security. Instead, the U.S. needs to expand its scope 
in search of genuine peace and security. The available “means” must shape the strategy, 
not the reverse. The financial and human costs in maintaining a future presence in 
Afghanistan are becoming difficult for the U.S. from every angle. As Kilcullen notes, 
there is only one option to succeed in Afghanistan: prevent the resurgence of al Qaeda 
sanctuaries, protect the Afghans, build state institutions and then hands-off.302 As he 
further says, “The hard fact is that however unpalatable, this option is a hill we simply 
have to climb if we seek anything worthy of the name “success” in Afghanistan.”303   
 But, this is only possible if the U.S.—in sync with the Afghan government—uses 
the political tool as its main source of power—both within and outside of Afghanistan. 
By adopting “best practices in COIN,” which are population-centric, instead of the 
practices that are biased towards CT or kinetics, a respectable solution may yet be 
found.304  This also means taking into account the ambitions of the other actors—
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V.  THE REGIONAL POWER POLITICS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Most analysts have realized that the war in Afghanistan cannot be fully 
understood in isolation. President Bush’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) generated much 
debate. By invading and putting boots on the ground in Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO 
automatically became entangled in the “most perilous” region in the world—according to 
President Bill Clinton’s assessment.305  There is no way now to stop the impact of the 
stakeholders’ conflicting interests. This region was the victim of the “Great Game” 
between two imperial powers in the nineteenth century, and then again during the Cold 
War—and still suffers from their bitter legacies. Afghanistan forms a buffer between 
Central Asia and South Asia, regions which have been plagued by intra and inter-state 
disputes since the end of their respective colonial eras.  Capturing or killing Bin-Laden 
might be the most important goal for the U.S. in Afghanistan; however, there is no 
denying the fact that the U.S., like other regional and international actors, also has 
strategic interests in this region.   
This chapter will touch on the conflicting interests of Afghanistan’s neighbors and 
other important actors to highlight the negative impact of power politics on this conflict. 
Each of Afghanistan’s neighbors has ethnic ties with Afghans, through which these 
neighbors have built spheres of influence in the country over the centuries. Without the 
help of and accommodation by these actors, the U.S. can forget about any positive 
outcome from this protracted war. In February 2009, General David Petraeus rightly said 
that “in fact, those seeking to help Afghanistan and Pakistan need to widen the aperture 
even farther, to encompass at least the Central Asian states, India, and even China and 
Russia.”306  
This chapter will review the conflicting interests of Iran, India, China, and Russia 
in Afghanistan and Central Asia. While discussing these states we will also consider the 
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U.S.’s and Pakistan’s interests in them, which will provide readers a fair idea about the 
ongoing power politics in the region, apart from just the war in Afghanistan.    
B. IRAN 
With the Iranian revolution and then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
Iran’s objectives in Afghanistan changed. The U.S. hostage crisis of 1980 in Tehran 
transformed two former allies into enemies. Although Iran staunchly condemned the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it still maintained amiable relations with the USSR. 
During the Soviet occupation, Iran’s policy was confined to creating an “ideological 
sphere of influence” among the 20% Shi’ite population in Afghanistan.307 Since then, 
Iran has had a security-centered foreign policy of protecting and expanding its interests, 
and neutralizing the perceived threat from the U.S., a threat Tehran regards as 
existential.308 A stable Afghanistan, with Herat as a buffer zone, and a friendly 
government in Kabul is in Iran’s interests. Throughout its occupation, the Soviets kept a 
“hands-off” policy toward the Shi’ite population in Afghanistan, a concession to the 
Khomeini regime. Consequently, there was no resistance from this sect of Muslims 
against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  
 At the international conferences prior to the Soviet withdrawal, Washington and 
Moscow pledged non-interference in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, their pledges created a 
dangerous vacuum, sucking Pakistan, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia into proxy warfare 
during the post-Soviet period.309 Saudi Arabia sought expansion of Wahabisim in 
Afghanistan and the CARs, while Pakistan sought a Pashtun-dominated government that 
would accept the Durand Line as a border and allow this to become a lucrative bridge 
connecting the CARs with the Arabian Sea. Such developments would also provide 
Pakistan with “strategic depth” against its archrival, India.  
Iran’s and India’s objectives clashed with Pakistan’s and Saudi Arabia’s. Because 
of this, Afghanistan and Pakistan remained areas for proxy battles between 1989 and 
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1996. Even before the Soviet withdrawal, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani announced in 
1987 in Moscow that “we are prepared to assist you, so that after departure there will be 
no U.S. domination in Afghanistan.”310 Tehran, subsequently worked to expand its 
“political sphere of influence” by encouraging Shi’ite groups and non-Pashto speaking 
groups (e.g., Dari) to form the Hezb-e-Wahdat party in 1990, which later allied itself with 
the NA (and with both Tajik commander Ahamad Shah Masud and Uzbek commander 
Rashid Dostum).311  
The Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996 with Pakistani and Saudi assistance 
delivered a severe blow to Iran in Afghanistan; Iran openly supported the NA. The NA 
continued to prove a challenge for the Taliban, since it maintained its sovereignty in the 
Panjsher valley. Although the U.S. refrained from openly supporting the Taliban in order 
to avoid further damaging relations with Russia and Iran, the U.S. signaled its tacit 
support to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.312 Meanwhile, Pakistan announced development of 
Gwadar port in 2000, Iran started work on its port in Chabahar with Indian assistance: the 
aim is for this to provide Central Asia with access to warm waters.313 India is also 
building a road from Chabahar, running parallel to the Pakistan-Iran border before 
entering Afghanistan, on its way to the CARs.314 
 
Figure 10.   Chahbahar port and construction of road by India to Afghanistan. 
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Clearly, the U.S. does not want Iran to benefit from achieving the shortest 
pipeline between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Arabian Sea315—and not when  
UNOCAL (American oil company) and DELTA (Saud oil company),  along with India 
and Pakistan, would be major beneficiaries of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) pipeline project instead.316 Knowing this, it then serves Iran’s and Russia’s 
purposes to keep the region unstable by backing an anti-Taliban alliance so that U.S. 
pipelines planned to run through Afghanistan and Pakistan are never built.317  
The dismantling of the Taliban regime by the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 
amounted to a unintended favor to Iran from its enemy. Ironically, U.S. policies helped 
Iran to regain its regional power status by removing Iran’s major threats in its immediate 
neighborhood: namely, the Taliban and Saddam regimes.318 After the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, Iran’s focus shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq. Within a short span of time, 
Iran extended its sphere of influence in Iraq. Today, Iran possesses better levers for 
bargaining with the U.S. than it did in 2001—being in the middle of two theaters in 
which America is embroiled in protracted insurgencies. Iran has considerable influence in 
both these theaters, and in the region. Iran’s unflinching stance on its nuclear program 
can be seen as one consequence of these developments, which have emboldened Iran to 
stay the course given U.S. vulnerabilities and U.S.’s deteriorating international standing. 
Tellingly, China has refused to support any tougher actions against Iran over its nuclear 
program. Although Secretary Clinton warned China about “economic insecurity and 
diplomatic isolation,”319 Beijing is itself upset about the U.S. decision to sell $6.4 billion 
worth of arms to Taiwan.320 Consequently, the U.S. may not get the support it needs from 
the UN Security Council for tougher action against Iran from either China or Russia.  
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As Western pressure has built over Iran’s nuclear program, the U.S. has noted 
Iran’s increasing support to the Taliban—a claim confirmed by Secretary Gates.321 Iran 
has the ability to pull Hezbollah’s strings in Lebanon against Israel, raise Shi’ite 
resistance in Iraq, and continue providing assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan. While 
the U.S. hopes to involve Iran in a dialogue on Afghanistan (AfPak Policy), the U.S. 
itself is allegedly involved in supporting a militant group called “Jundullah” in Iran, 
which has sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan’s Baluchistan province.322 Iran’s 
suspicions have created further a rift between both neighbors. Iran also accuses the U.S. 
and UK of sponsoring the opposition led post-presidential election protests in Tehran.  
The absence of Iran from the London conference of February 28, 2010 on 
Afghanistan should not be taken lightly, since it is an important stake holder with 
considerable influence in Afghanistan. For as long as the U.S. is present on the ground in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the possibility of an Israeli or a joint U.S.-Israeli strike against 
Iran’s nuclear sites remains low due to the U.S.’s extremely vulnerable position in both  
theaters of war and Iran’s improved position in the region, as well as its relations with 
Russia and China.      
C. INDIA 
 Indian foreign policy is based on being an “undisputed champion of all no-
nonsense realists, a monster of cunning and bluntness.” Or so wrote Kautilya, an ancient 
Indian in his Arthashastra, or science of politics, in 300 B.C.E.323 Kautilya’s recent 
equivalent is Machiavelli. In Kautilya’s analysis of international relations, a leader must 
assume that “all neighboring states are enemies, whereas, by contrast, any state on the 
opposite side of the neighboring state is a potential ally.”324 Or, the enemy of my enemy 
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is my best friend.  A close analysis of India’s relations with its immediate neighbors 
confirms Indian faith in the practice of this age old political philosophy.   
 During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India, a champion of the Non-
Aligned Movement maintained a neutral position. However, in hindsight, we can say 
India backed the Soviet occupation in order to retain its influence in Afghanistan and to 
assure it would continue to receive supply of military hardware from its major supplier, 
the USSR. This support was also a result of U.S. and Pakistan working together against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the course of this, the U.S. overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear 
program and resumed military and financial aid to Pakistan. Unfortunately, 9/11 helped 
reconstitute closer Pakistan-U.S. relations, a development that India resents. 
 In view of South Asian turbulent history and India’s political philosophy, its 
principle goal in Afghanistan after 9/11 has been a pro-India government that will protect 
Delhi’s interests. India would like to deny the return of the Taliban or any pro-Pakistan 
government to Kabul in order to keep Pakistan under constant threat from two fronts. 
India also seeks to deny the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism in India and IHK. 
Finally, India seeks access to the CARs for economic and security reasons.  
 After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Jihadists’ felt emboldened as 
victors. Having defeated a superpower in Afghanistan, they shifted their focus to IHK in 
order to end the Indian occupation and complete the unfinished agenda of Partition. The 
U.S. came under increasing pressure from India in 1992–93 to declare Pakistan a state 
sponsor of terrorism.325 India accused Pakistan of shifting the Jihadists’ bases from 
Pakistan to Afghanistan under the Mujahedeen allies and later the Taliban. Mullah Omar 
announced in 1998 that “we support the Jihad in Kashmir.” He also accepted that certain 
Afghans were fighting against the Indian occupation forces voluntarily.326 India sought to 
deny this ‘strategic depth’ to Pakistan in Afghanistan. The hijacking of an Indian 
passenger plane in 1999, and its landing at Kandahar airport, exacerbated Indian fears  
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about Afghanistan’s role in India’s security paradigm. India had to release Masood Azhar 
(leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad) and Omar Sheikh (Daniel Pearl’s kidnapper) with the 
hostages. Both reportedly fled to Pakistan.327 
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, India gradually began to seek better 
relations with the U.S. India also declared Central Asia to be “our near abroad” in 1997, 
after proclaiming its ambition to become a global power.328 India’s overarching goals in 
Central Asia are to: Secure a diverse energy base in competition with China; keep a 
check on the radical Islamist threat; check drug trafficking, a major source of terrorist 
financing; and use “India’s commercial potential in the region to counter Pakistan’s 
attempts of blunting the Indian presence through its geostrategic location.”329 For 
instance, India is engaged in a 1,680 km-long pipeline project that will link it with 
Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Indian state-owned, Videsh Oil 
Company has also invested in Kazakhstan, a country that has large quantities of enriched 
uranium.330 This is significant, especially after India received its NSG waiver as a result 
of Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation.   
 It is worth noting that India, unlike Iran, has long refused to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  However, despite this, the Bush administration went ahead with a 
civil nuclear deal with India in an effort to open India to American defense companies 
(Lockheed Martin alone hopes to do $15 billion worth of business within five years).331 
This deal, apart from its many other implications, is bound to plunge the region into a 
renewed arms race—both conventional and nuclear.  
 Also, Tajikistan, an important CAR, functions as a critical channel for funneling 
support to the NA in Afghanistan for India, Iran, and Russia (India provided $8 million to 
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the NA in 2001).332 Another Indian strategic arrangement with Tajikistan is acquisition 
of its first foreign “outpost” at Ayni airbase, where India has stationed a squadron of MiG 
29s. This enables India to respond to threats emanating from Afghanistan, Central Asia, 
and Pakistan.333 From Pakistan’s perspective, India’s construction of the road from the 
Iranian port of Chabahar to Afghanistan increases its influence in Afghanistan.  With its 
military base in Tajikistan, India is achieving a “strategic encirclement” of Pakistan, and 
to some extent of China, too.      
 In the post-Taliban period, India has heavily invested in development work in 
Afghanistan to protect its goals there and in the CARs. India’s pledged assistance to 
Afghanistan is over $1.2 billion in a variety of sectors. The Indian government has 
delivered projects well in time and with consistency.334 While India is thus viewed as a 
reliable partner, Pakistan has serious concerns about India’s RAW activities in 
Baluchistan and the NWFP provinces in Pakistan.335  
 Mr. Karl Indurfurth, a former senior U.S. diplomat, advised in January 2008 that 
“Kabul should address Pakistan’s concerns on India, and its allies should urge Kabul to 
officially accept [the] Durand Line as the border between the two South Asian 
neighbors.”336 Even General McChrystal’s report, ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment,’ 
dated 30 August 2009 makes the critical point: “While Indian activities largely benefit 
the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate 
regional tensions and Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.”337 
Interestingly, in a joint statement issued after a meeting between the Indian and Pakistani 
Prime Ministers at a NAM summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 16 July 2009, India 
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agreed to share information about terrorism in Baluchistan.338 India’s Prime Minister, 
Mr. Manmohan Singh, stirred up heated reactions from his Congress party and Hindu 
nationalists (the Bahartia Janata Party) over this statement—seen as a confession of 
India’s involvement in Pakistan.   
D. CHINA     
Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our 
capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and 
never claim leadership.339 –Deng Xiaoping  
China’s interests in the region are mainly: to have a pro-China regime in Kabul 
that does not allow the export of Islamist ideology to China; to maintain a strategic 
relationship with Pakistan, which serves China’s interests in the CARs and South Asia, 
and protects its Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) in the Indian Ocean; and to support 
a counter to Indian and U.S. influence in its neighborhood. China showed little interest in 
Afghanistan previously. However, with Afghanistan’s openness to foreign investment 
after the removal of the Taliban regime and with its own growing energy needs, China 
has invested $3.5 billion in the Aynak copper fields—the biggest direct foreign 
investment in Afghanistan’s history.340 As China is often said to be the U.S.’s closest 
near peer competitor, China’s increasing involvement in Afghanistan conflicts with U.S. 
interests in the region. 
 China’s ‘wild West’ province, Xinjiang, shares an insignificant stretch of border 
with Afghanistan. Altogether, Xinjiang province is bounded by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The Muslim Uighur community has been struggling for 
greater autonomy from the Han-dominated Chinese central government for decades. 
Xinjiang remains indispensable to China because of its abundance of natural resources 
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and its location with regard to the CARs.341The Muslim majority Uighurs have been 
systemically reduced from 90% of Xinjiang’s population in 1945 to 45–50% today due to 
increased Han settlements.342 With the building of the Karakorum highway, linking 
Xinjiang province with the northern areas of Pakistan, China’s fears of greater 
radicalization of Uighurs have also increased. Pakistan has taken all measures in its 
power to allay Chinese fears about any support from extremist political Islamist parties in 
Pakistan.    
 The Karakorum highway has both economic and military strategic significance.  
According to India, construction of this road is “a military sinister movement directed against 
India.”343 Perhaps India says this because China is such a reliable partner of Pakistan’s, 
having provided considerable military hardware and assisted Pakistan in development of its 
nuclear and missile technology. China has always been supportive of Pakistan’s stand on 
Kashmir and provides considerable political support to Pakistan in all international forums.  
Sino-Indian relations have been tense for two main reasons: the territorial disputes over 
Aksai Chin (Kashmir), and Arunachal Pradesh (90,000 sq km), and Indian support to the 
exiled Dali Lama regime of Tibet.  
 Among the major reasons for strained relations between the U.S. and China are: 
Taiwan, the status of Dali Lama, North Korea, and China’s record human rights—as per U.S. 
perceptions. China is an emerging superpower, which automatically puts it on a potential 
confrontation path with the U.S. The U.S. “Nuclear Posture Review” in March 2002, and 
U.S. Congress’s “Report of U.S.-China Security Review Commission” in July 2002, 
concluded that China’s economic and military growth would pose a serious national security 
threat to the U.S., and suggested “rolling back” bilateral cooperation, especially in trade and 
high technology.344 
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Figure 11.   China’s critical sea lanes and disputed territory with India.345  
 As China grows, secure access to markets and diverse energy resources are 
essential to it maintaining and sustaining its growth. Against this backdrop is the need to 
secure the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean. China currently consumes 7.58 million barrels of 
oil a day and is the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the U.S. (by 2015, this 
will increase to 10–12 million barrels per day).346 Eighty-percent of the oil China needs 
passes through the Malacca straits, fifty percent of which comes from the Middle East 
(Persian Gulf).347 China feels that its SLOCs can be all too conveniently threatened by 
U.S. and Indian dominance of the Indian Ocean, as well as by the U.S. naval presence in 
the South China Sea.  For their part, the U.S. and India suspect China of pursuing a 
“string of pearls” strategy, which aims to secure ports along the rim of the Indian Ocean 
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh in order to counter the vulnerability of 
its SLOCs. The Gwadar port in Pakistan and the port in Myanmar can be linked to 
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China’s Xinjiang and Yunnan provinces, respectively, through pipelines that will further 
minimize China’s dependence on the flow of oil through the Indian Ocean.348  
 To keep its options for alternative energy supplies open, China has shored up its 
overland sources from Kazakhstan (via a pipeline), Russia (via rail, with plans for a 
pipeline), and Turkmenistan (via pipeline).349China cannot totally rely on oil from the 
CARs and Russia because the overland pipelines will be passing through Xinjiang 
province where there is the Uighur movement, and because relations between Russia and 
China are “fraught with cross-currents of competition, suspicion, and Russian energy 
policy paralysis.”350Since Russia continues to influence the CARs from every angle, 
China cannot put all its eggs into one basket.    
 Pakistan envisaged developing the Gwadar port as an outlet to the Central Asian 
energy resources after the CARs’ independence. During President Musharraf’s tenure, 
Pakistan signed an agreement with China to develop Gwadar, for which China agreed to 
finance 80% of the project costs.351 President Musharraf expressed his gratitude to China 
by saying, “It is the friendship between China and Pakistan that has made my dreams of 
Gwadar come true. We thank China.”352 The Gwadar deepwater port has the capacity to 
become a major shipping hub for Central Asia, China, and the Middle East, as well as for 
bringing China most of the crude oil it needs.353 
 The U.S. and India fear that this is not merely a commercial project, but one 
which could be easily used and developed for military purposes in the future. Because of 
Gwadar’s location, Baluchistan province assumes strategic significance within the overall 
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regional geo-political game.354 That makes Baluchistan of especial significance to both 
India and Iran, which further complicates Pakistan’s concerns. 
E. RUSSIA 
We cannot help seeing the uproar stirred up in some Western countries 
over the energy resources of the Caspian. Some seek to exclude Russia 
from the game and undermine its interests. The so-called pipeline war in 
the region is part of this game.—Boris Yeltsin (1998).355   
 Before exploring Russia’s principle interests, it will be prudent to have a look at U.S. 
interests in this region. When President Bush first met President Putin on June 16, 2001, he 
expressed his feelings that, “Russia and the U.S. are not enemies, they do not threaten each 
other, and they could be good allies. Russia can be a strong partner; more than people can 
imagine.”356 After 9/11, these former antagonists grew closer in light of the threat posed by 
international terrorism. Moscow did not object when the U.S. approached Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan for military bases in support of OEF. Regrettably, the unilateral renunciation of 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 by President Bush on December 13, 2001 did alarm 
Russia.  
 The U.S. investment in Afghanistan and its engagement there and in Central Asia 
represents a long-term endeavor to meet its interests.357 The major U.S. interests in the 
region can be summarized as: defense of America and Europe from Islamic terrorism after 
the 9/11 attacks; the maintenance of access to airspace and territory in Asia; development of 
alternative energy sources; and promotion of democracy in the CARs (and South Asia).358 
Consequently, removing the Taliban in 2001 and efforts thereafter to establish a viable and 
legitimate Afghan government under President Karzai have been critical to helping the 
U.S. achieve these goals.  
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 Essentially, the U.S. wants to end Russia’s monopoly over the distribution of oil 
and gas from the CARs, so that the U.S. and Western firms can compete in the 
exploration and distribution of these natural resources. The U.S. also seeks to isolate Iran 
from the CARs by urging states to bypass Iran, and threatening sanctions against those 
that do not comply with U.S. wishes.359 Two projected pipelines that bypass Iran and 
Russia are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and TAPI. Not surprisingly, the U.S. does not 
object to them. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Existing and projected oil and gas pipelines from the CARs.360 
 Today, Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran are countering U.S. interests, as they view 
America’s political and military presence as a threat to their security and interests in the 
region.  Prior to 9/11, Russia had serious reservations about NATO’s eastward expansion. 
President Putin had proclaimed that enlargement of NATO was “not necessary.”361 
Russia is also wary of the U.S. desire to bring the CARs under its influence for all the 
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reasons mentioned above. The Cold War does not seem to have ended entirely as Russia 
struggles to retain influence over its former states, while denying the same to the U.S. and 
the West. Russia supported the U.S.’s ‘war on terror,’ as in return, it received a free hand 
in Chechnya. Like Iran, Russia gained from the Taliban’s removal. Still, Russia does not 
wish to have an indefinite American presence in such close proximity.  
 In order to check U.S. influence in the region, Moscow has increased its 
cooperation with China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Russia has established a “gas cartel” 
under the guise of an energy club under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization forum, with Iran, Algeria, and Qatar also as members.362 Meanwhile, 
through the “KazMunaiGaz deal,” all natural gas produced in the CARs will be 
controlled by Gazprom, the world’s largest extractor of natural gas.363 This implies that 
natural gas from any CAR is bound to transit through Kazakhstan and Russia on its way 
to market—putting Russia in firm control of these vast resources.364  
 This Russian monopoly over natural gas poses a threat to European energy 
security, as well as limiting the CARs’ freedom. But, for Russia, any outlet for oil and 
gas from Central Asia on the Arabian Sea or through the Caspian Sea to Turkey would be 
a strategic, economic, and political disaster. Russia has shown its resolve to intervene 
militarily in states if its interests are threatened. Russia’s spearheading of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), with the USSR’s former states as members, is 
another effort by Russia to deny these states falling under NATO’s shadow, as well as 
preventing the CARs from providing any military base to the U.S. or NATO without 
Russia’s approval.365   
 For instance, under pressure from Moscow, Uzbekistan ordered the closure of the 
Karshi-Khanabad (K2) U.S. military base in 2005.366 The American’s base at Manas, 
Kyrgyzstan may also close under similar pressure. In July 2005, the Kyrgyz government 
demanded an increase in rent to which the U.S. succumbed by pledging an additional 
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$200 million interest-free loan.367 General Richard Myers rebuked Russia and China over 
their pressure on Kyrgyzstan when he said, “it looks to me like two very large countries 
were trying to bully some smaller countries.”368 
 Pakistan seeks the pipeline projects from the CARs, all of which will keep alive 
U.S. Russian, Indian, Chinese, and Iranian interests—and potential interference. Since 
Pakistan holds a pivotal geostrategic location with regard to the successful completion of 
these pipeline projects, it will be subject to these competing interests—in addition to 
those sparked by the Afghanistan war. Russia has also not forgotten Pakistan’s role 
during the “Afghan Jihad,” which led to its disintegration later. This also may be a 
contributing factor in Pakistan’s volatile current situation and a source of destabilization.     
F. CONCLUSION 
Guerrilla insurgency is quintessentially a political phenomenon; any 
effective response to it must be primarily political as well. [I]f insurgency 
and counterinsurgency are fundamentally political, then the primary goal 
of counterinsurgency policy should be peace. More broadly, lasting 
peace—that is, lasting victory—comes through conciliation.369    
 From a brief review of the conflicting interests of the important actors in the 
region, it is clear that peripheral gestures by the U.S. aimed at increasing cooperation will 
not end the fundamental disagreements that already exist among them. There are serious 
points of contention that prevent the development of amicable relations among some of 
these states.  What is required, instead, are means of building trust and reciprocity instead 
of bulldozing along through bilateralism. The support that the U.S. received from friends 
and foes alike after the 9/11 attacks has largely dissipated due to Washington’s myopic 
concerns. In order to advance genuine cooperation and build stable relations, the U.S. 
needs to take a leading role in removing, for instance Russian, Chinese, and Iranian fears 
about the U.S.’s protracted presence in the region; these fears are genuine if one bears in 
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mind the nature of their past and existing rivalries. From the perspective of most of other 
regional players, the U.S. does not belong in the region and, thus, its presence is 
considered to be interference in others’ domain.  
 It will be impossible for the U.S. to sustain its presence in Afghanistan without 
reasonably accommodating these other states’ genuine political, economic, and security 
concerns. If we include Iraq, too, in the equation, the U.S. is in a bind. So far, its actions have 
done more harm than good to international relations and to the conflict in Afghanistan. 
Ironically, the only two states with which the U.S. enjoys good relations in this region are 
Pakistan and India—the two archrivals.   
 In view of Pakistan’s geo-strategic location, the U.S. has little choice but to rely on 
Pakistan with regard to the Afghanistan war and pursuit of the U.S.’s legitimate interests in 
Central Asia. Regrettably, the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations has not always been good, 
and the U.S. has not done all it can to re-cement relations (as we saw in Chapter III). The 
U.S. alone decided to occupy Afghanistan. However, now, for an honorable exit and 
protection of its interests in the region, the U.S. is in dire need of assistance, which in turn 
requires cooperation from all the important actors in the region, but especially as it finds 
itself at this most critical juncture of its protracted campaign.     
 Throughout this thesis, the impact of regional disputes has been highlighted so that 
readers may understand the dynamic nature of this overlooked aspect of the conflict. A 
prudent U.S. policy toward the region can facilitate a peaceful resolution of many of these 
disputes, something the U.S. must strive to achieve if it wants to remain engaged in the 
region for the long-term.  Among other things, as the U.S. encourages India, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan to settle their disputes peacefully, either bilaterally or through mediation, it 
should guarantee them security until such time as the peace process yields effective, 
demonstrable peace. For its part, too, the U.S. needs to review its policy towards China, Iran, 
and Russia so that these states do not feel threatened by the U.S.’s long-term presence in the 
region, or else another Cold War will ruin the peace. In essence, much depends on how far 
the U.S. is ready to go beyond its current world view in order to take into account the world 
view of others. Only by adopting a balanced foreign policy can the US help ensure a durable 
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